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Abstract
Large-scale increases in discriminatory attitudes can lead to the dismissal of highly qualied
business leaders who belong to targeted groups. We study how the forced removal of Jewish
managers in Nazi Germany, caused by surging antisemitism, aected large rms. The loss of
Jewish managers with certain qualications led to large and persistent stock price reductions
for aected rms. Dividend payments and returns on assets also declined. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests that the aggregate market valuation of rms listed in Berlin fell
by 1.8 percent of German GNP. The ndings imply that discrimination can lead to persistent
and rst-order economic losses.
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Large-scale increases in discriminatory attitudes can lead to the dismissal of highly qualied
business leaders who belong to targeted groups. Recent political developments in several countries
have renewed interest in the eects of this form of discrimination. For example, the travel ban on
citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries has raised fears among large U.S. corporations that
increasing discrimination will leave them unable to retain talent.1 In Turkey, several thousand
managers who follow the cleric Fethullah Gülen have been arrested or have ed overseas since
2016, fueling concerns of an economic collapse (New York Times 2017; The Economist 2017b).
History is replete with cases where the rise of a discriminatory ideology forced highly qualied
individuals to give up important positions in the economy. Examples include the forced internment
of Japanese-Americans during World War II, the eviction of the entrepreneurial Huguenots from
17th century France, the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972, and the emigration of ethnic
Chinese from Indonesia following discriminatory laws in 1959 and anti-Chinese riots in 1998.2
Such discriminatory dismissals are, of course, extremely hurtful to the targeted individuals. But
there is little evidence on whether such discrimination can cause economic losses for rms and the
economy as a whole, beyond hurting the welfare of the discriminated individuals. In particular,
it has not been established how easily rms can replace leaders who leave due to discrimination,
which particular individual characteristics are hard to replace, and how long it can take rms to
recover.
In this paper, we analyze one of the most horrendous episodes of discrimination in human
history, the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany. Our study examines how the removal of senior
managers of Jewish origin, caused by the rise of antisemitism in Nazi Germany, aected large Ger-
man rms. After the Nazis gained power on January 30, 1933, discrimination against Jews quickly
became commonplace in Germany. By 1938, individuals with Jewish ancestry had eectively been
excluded from the German economy. Using newly collected data, we show that rms that had
employed managers of Jewish origin were unable to replace them adequately. The stock prices,
dividend payments, and returns on assets of these rms declined persistently after 1933 and did
not recover for at least 10 years, the end of our sample period. Losing managers with university
degrees and with connections to other rms was particularly harmful, while losing experienced
managers had little eect. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that removing managers
1Concerned rms include Amazon (Wingeld and Wakabayashi 2017), Nike (Cox 2017), MasterCard (McGregor
2017), and Ben & Jerry’s (Solheim 2017).
2Japanese-Americans were on average highly educated and some were important managers, in particular in rms
supplying agricultural products (Chin 2005). They were interned due to “race prejudice” (U.S. CWRIC 1982). The
Huguenots (French Protestants) were among the “wealthiest merchants and most successful industrialists” and their
inuence on the French economy was “disproportionate to their numbers” (Scoville 1953). After 1685, over 200,000
Huguenots left France following religious persecution. Most settled in England, the Dutch Republic, and Prussia (for
example, Hornung 2014). Asians made up less than one percent of the Ugandan population but owned 90 percent of
businesses and paid 90 percent of tax revenue. In 1972, about 50,000 Asians were expelled by military ruler Idi Amin
(BBC 2016). Ethnic Chinese have an “impressive business presence” in Indonesia and have faced repeated waves of
ethnic discrimination since the 18th century (Koning 2007).
1
of Jewish origin reduced the aggregate market valuation of rms listed in Berlin by 1.8 percent
of German gross national product.3 This sizable decrease shows that the rise of a discriminatory
ideology can lead to rst-order and persistent economic losses, by causing the removal of qualied
business leaders.
Before the rise of the Nazis, managers of Jewish origin played a key role in the German economy.
In fact, the “economic role of Jews in Germany (...) was greater than that in Western industrialized
countries like England, France, or Holland. It also exceeded almost certainly their role in the devel-
opment of the American economy” (Mosse 1987, p. 23). Managers of Jewish origin were assimilated
into the German economic elite. Intermarriages and conversions to Christianity were common.
Managers of Jewish origin worked in all types of rms, including in some of the largest German
rms that were not associated with Judaism in any way (for example, Allianz, BMW, Daimler-Benz,
Siemens & Halske, and I.G. Farben). After the Nazis gained power, antisemitism surged across the
whole economy and German rms began to dismiss managers of Jewish origin. Deutsche Bank, for
example, forced CEO Oscar Wassermann and executive board member Theodor Frank to resign
their positions by June 1, 1933 (James 2001, pp. 25-26). The dismissals targeted a range of indi-
viduals, including managers who had converted to Christianity in the 19th century or Christians
who had just one Jewish ancestor. Firms that happened to employ managers of Jewish origin lost a
signicant fraction of their senior managers as a result of antisemitic discrimination. Other rms
did not have any managers of Jewish origin and, therefore, remained unscathed.
To carry out our analysis, we collect the names and characteristics of individuals holding around
30,000 senior management positions in all 655 German rms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
We also digitize more than 240,000 daily stock prices from a historic publication series by the Berlin
Stock Exchange, and data on dividends and returns on assets from historic volumes ofHandbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. We consult various historical sources to identify which managers
were of Jewish origin. While the fraction of Jews among the German population in the early 1930s
was only 0.8 percent, our new data show that 15.8 percent of senior management positions in
listed rms were held by individuals of Jewish origin in 1932. We nd that the share of managers
of Jewish origin (which for simplicity we call “Jewish managers”) was roughly constant between
1928 and 1932, plunged dramatically in 1933 (by about a third), and dropped to practically zero in
1938. Jewish managers had exceptional characteristics compared to other managers in 1932. For
example, Jewish managers were on average more experienced, more likely to hold a university
degree, and more connected to other rms, as measured by seats on the supervisory boards of
other rms.
3This number is likely to be a lower bound for the aggregate economic losses to the German economy due to
antisemitic discrimination, since Jews were also removed from lower-level positions, rms not listed in Berlin, and
important positions in universities, law courts, hospitals, orchestras, theaters, and other institutions. Of course, this
number also does not attempt to do justice to the indescribable human suering and loss of life that the Nazi ideology
brought on Jews and other targeted groups.
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We present four main sets of results. We rst show that losing the Jewish managers changed the
observable characteristics of managers at rms that had employed a higher fraction of Jewish man-
agers in 1932. The number of managers with rm-specic tenure, general managerial experience,
university degrees, and the total number of connections to other rms fell signicantly, relative to
rms that had not employed any Jewish managers in 1932. The eects on all management charac-
teristics persisted at least until 1938, the end of our sample period on manager characteristics.
In the second set of results, we show that the loss of Jewish managers aected rms’ stock
prices. The stock price of the average rm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932 (where 22
percent of managers had been of Jewish origin) declined by 10.3 log points after the Nazis came to
power, relative to a rm without Jewish managers in 1932. We also estimate the timing of the stock
price drop. Before the Nazis came to power, stock prices of rms with a higher fraction of Jewish
managers were not on dierential trends. Starting in 1933, when Jewish managers were forced out
of their rms, stock prices of rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers declined sharply.
These losses persisted until the end of the stock price sample period in 1943, 10 years after the
Nazis had gained power. The stock price results are unchanged when we control for several rm
observables, such as connections to the Nazi Party (Ferguson and Voth 2008), rm size, age, and
industry. The results are also similar in a sample of rms that all had at least one Jewish manager
(using only intensive margin variation in the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 to identify the
eect).
We proceed to investigate whether stock price fell because rms lost managers with specic
characteristics. The results indicate that stock prices only declined for rms that had at least one
of two features: rst, rms that lost a large share of university-educated managers; and second,
rms that lost a large share of total managerial connections (measured by seats on other rms’ su-
pervisory boards). Stock prices did not fall for other rms that lost Jewish managers. In particular,
there were no eects for rms that lost small shares of their university-educated and connected
managers or for rms that lost experienced managers. This is an important nding. It implies that
not all rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 experienced lower stock prices after
1933. Hence, it is unlikely that other shocks to rms with Jewish managers in 1932 explain the de-
clines in stock prices. Rather, the ndings strengthen the view that losses of particular managerial
characteristics (i.e. losses of educated and connected managers) lowered rm performance.
We explore further whether the declines in stock prices after 1933 were caused by the removal
of Jewish managers or by other shocks that were correlated with the fraction of Jewish managers
in 1932. We rst consider shocks that resulted from the general increase in antisemitism after
1933. One possibility is that the Nazi government used repressive measures against rms that had
employed Jewish managers in 1932. To explore this possibility, we restrict the sample to only rms
favored by the Nazi government, such as rms that supported the Nazis before 1933 or rms that
received forced labor from the Nazi government. The restriction reduces sample size from 655 to
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171 rms, but the estimated eect of losing Jewish managers remains of similar magnitude and
statistically signicant. This suggests that repression by the Nazi government does not explain the
eect of losing Jewish managers.
To further investigate the eect of shocks resulting from antisemitism, we identify rms that
the public and the Nazis perceived to be “Jewish,” using a range of historical sources.4 It was well-
known in Nazi Germany that these rms were connected to Judaism, so antisemitic measures by
the government and the public were focused on these rms. We nd that the stock prices of “Jewish
rms” started to decline signicantly after 1935. This is consistent with the historical literature,
which argues that large rms associated with Judaism suered from government repression after
1935 (Barkai 1990, p. 83; Strauss 1999, p. XVII; James 2001, p. 38). Importantly, we show that
the eect of losing Jewish managers remains unchanged when we control for the eect on Jewish
rms. Furthermore, comparing the evolution of stock prices of Jewish rms to rms that lost Jewish
managers is revealing. The stock prices of Jewish rms fell in 1935 and recovered fully by 1943,
once all formerly Jewish rms had been taken over by non-Jews. The stock prices of rms with
Jewish managers in 1932 declined most strongly in 1933 and 1934, when rms started to remove
Jewish managers, and remained low until 1943. The contrasting evolution of stock prices suggests
that the eects of losing Jewish managers were not driven by government repression, losses of
customers, or other forces that hit Jewish rms, but by forces specically associated with the loss
of Jewish managers.
We consider other potential shocks to rms that were driven by antisemitic discrimination
and that may have been correlated with the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. We nd that a
decrease in the number of lower-ranked Jewish employees is unlikely to drive the results, because
the eects of losing Jewish managers are stable when we restrict the sample to regions and sectors
that employed very few lower-ranked Jewish employees in 1933. The eects are also stable when
we exclude rms with large Jewish investors or rms aected by antisemitic retail boycotts.
The second type of correlated shocks we consider stems from dierential changes in rms’ de-
mand that are unrelated to antisemitic discrimination. The Nazi government started heavy rearma-
ment and infrastructure programs after 1933. This disproportionately beneted rms in armament
production and construction. We test whether rms in these sectors drive our results. First, we
exclude from the sample all rms that appear on historical lists of suppliers to the Reichswehr. Sec-
ond, we drop all rms in iron and steel production, machine tools, and chemicals, which amounts
to dropping around half of our sample rms. Third, we exclude all rms in the construction sector.
In all these dierent samples, the eects are similar to the baseline estimates. These results sug-
gest that dierences in exposure to Nazi rearmament or construction programs do not aect the
results. Our nal robustness check identies rms that had international activities, using narra-
4This group of “Jewish rms” is distinct from rms with Jewish managers in 1932, since many German rms
happened to employ managers of Jewish origin without being perceived as “Jewish”, for example BMW, Deutsche
Reichsbahn, or I.G. Farben.
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tive evidence from historical rm records. International customers or trading partners may have
reduced demand for the products of some rms in response to the rise of the Nazis or the removal
of Jewish managers. When we exclude rms with international activities from the sample, the
ndings remain essentially unchanged. Taken together, all these tests conrm that other shocks,
due to rising antisemitic discrimination or due to dierences in demand, do not explain the stock
price declines for rms that lost Jewish managers.
In the third set of results, we estimate the aggregate cost of losing Jewish managers for rms
listed in Berlin. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the loss of the Jewish managers
reduced the market capitalization of the average listed rm by 5.2 percent after 1933. This implies
a decrease in the aggregate market valuation of 1.8 percent of German GNP. This result shows
that discrimination can cause serious economic losses when it leads to the exclusion of qualied
individuals from leading positions. The calculation assumes that removing the Jewish managers
from aected rms had negligible spillover eects on rms that had not employed any Jewish
managers in 1932. We test for such spillovers within regions and industries, and nd statistically
insignicant and negative spillover eects. This suggests that the calculation might, if anything,
underestimate the aggregate loss for listed rms.
In the fourth set of results, we analyze the eects of losing Jewish managers on two additional
measures of rm performance, dividend payments and returns on assets. We nd that after 1933,
dividend payments fell by approximately 7.5 percent for the average rm with Jewish managers in
1932 (which lost 22 percent of its managers). This magnitude is similar to the fall in stock prices,
which suggests that investors priced the stocks proportional to the dividends. We also nd that
after 1933, the average rm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932 experienced a decline in its
return on assets by 4.1 percentage points. These results indicate that the loss of Jewish managers
not only reduced market valuations, but also led to real losses in rm eciency and protability.
This paper contributes to the literature by studying discriminatory removals of highly qualied
individuals in leading positions, i.e. “discrimination at the top,” and by studying whether discrim-
ination causes economic losses beyond hurting discriminated individuals. The objective of our
study diers from the existing discrimination literature, which has largely focused on discrimina-
tion against women, black people, and underprivileged groups.5
In the existing literature on discrimination against women and blacks, few papers analyze the
eects of discrimination on rms. English soccer clubs with more black players achieve higher
league positions, conditional on the wage bill (Szymanski 2000). Inspired by Becker’s (1957) in-
uential prediction that discrimination reduces rm protability, a number of papers show that
rms with a higher proportion of female employees earn higher prots and have longer survival
rates (Hellerstein et al. 2002; Kawaguchi 2007; Weber and Zulehner 2014). In contrast, we propose
5The literature has largely analyzed whether discrimination against women and blacks aects individual hiring
probabilities and wages (see Altonji and Blank 1999; Bertrand 2011; Bertrand and Duo 2017 for extensive surveys).
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a quasi-experimental research design to estimate rm-level eects: We identify an economy-wide
increase in discrimination and then use rm-level variation in exposure to this shock to estimate
how rising discrimination aects rms.
An additional innovation of our approach is that we use stock prices to measure the costs of
discrimination for rms. Stock prices are a particularly attractive measure for the cost of discrim-
ination for rms because stock prices represent the present discounted value of future cash ows
from stock holdings. Hence, changes in stock prices fully incorporate how market participants
value the long-run costs of discrimination. Furthermore, by aggregating the rm-level estimates
we can approximate the aggregate cost of discrimination for all listed rms. The current litera-
ture contains little empirical evidence for how changes in discriminatory attitudes aect aggregate
outcomes.6 A large literature has used wages to measure discrimination. Fewer papers use other
market prices. For example, an important paper by List (2004) uses trading prices of sportscards to
analyze whether individuals from minorities face discrimination.
Another related literature studies management practices. Inuential studies by Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2017) argue that good management practices are akin to a more
ecient production technology. Gosnell et al. (forthcoming) show that adopting certain manage-
ment practices raises worker productivity.7 The results of our paper highlight a complementary
channel: Management quality depends not only on adoptable and learnable management practices,
but also on the exceptional human capital of individual managers who are hard to replace. Con-
sistent with the ndings of our paper, Kaplan et al. (2012) and Bandiera et al. (2017, forthcoming)
document a relationship between rm performance and individual managers’ ability and behavior,
respectively.8 We contribute to the literature by using a quasi-experimental research design. This
allows us to show that losing educated and connected managers aects rm performance, while
losing experienced managers does not. Furthermore, our approach enables us to trace rm perfor-
mance over time. We show that the eects of losing managers can be large and can persist for at
least 10 years after the initial shock. In contrast, most studies of manager deaths have focused on
short-run eects. Studies of manager deaths nd either small positive or small negative short-run
stock returns, depending on the characteristics of the managers (Johnson et al. 1985; Worrell et al.
1986; Hayes and Schaefer 1999; Borokhovich et al. 2006; Salas 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen 2010; Fee
et al. 2013; Jenter et al. 2017).9
6Hsieh et al. (forthcoming) use a structural Roy model to argue that declining discrimination against women and
blacks raised U.S. aggregate productivity.
7Some studies nd that training rms to improve general management practices can improve rm performance
(Bruhn et al. 2010, 2018; Bruhn and Zia 2013; Bloom et al. 2013a, forthcoming; Drexler et al. 2014; Giorcelli 2019).
Other studies report limited eects (Cole et al. 2011; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Karlan et al. 2015). This suggests the
eects may vary by the nature of training or rm type, size, or the available human capital in the rm.
8More generally, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) nd evidence that there are dierences in “style” across managers,
while Malmendier and Tate (2005) focus on the eects of overcondent managers on corporate investment decisions.
9Unlike many older managers who die, the Jewish managers in our setting were often at the peak of their ability.
Also related, Bennedsen et al. (2016) analyze temporary manager absences due to hospitalizations, nding transient
6
Finally, we show that the loss of the Jewish elite aected the German economy. Our specic
contribution is to highlight the cost for rms. Related, the dismissal of Jewish scientists and teach-
ers in Nazi Germany reduced the output of German science departments (Waldinger 2010, 2012,
2016) and harmed the education of students (Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel 2015). In Russia, the sever-
ity of the Holocaust was associated with long-run political and economic outcomes of cities and
regions (Acemoglu et al. 2011; Grosfeld et al. 2013).
1 Historical Context
1.1 Jews in the German Economy
Following the partial emancipation of Jews in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, and in particu-
lar following the full emancipation during German unication in 1871, Jews became increasingly
inuential in the German economy. They founded many important rms and became leading man-
agers in some of the largest German corporations. In 1908, 22 percent of the richest 747 Prussians
with fortunes exceeding 5 million Mark were of Jewish origin (Mosse 1987, p. 6). In 1928, Jews paid
more than 30 percent of Berlin’s city taxes, despite being only 5 percent of the population (Elon
2003, p. 259). Notwithstanding occasional episodes of antisemitism, German Jews were almost en-
tirely assimilated, especially among the economic elite. Inter-religious marriages were common in
the decades before 1933.10 Historians have argued that one could hardly dierentiate a Jewish eco-
nomic elite from a non-Jewish elite during the years of the Weimar Republic (for example Münzel
2006, p. 89).
1.2 The Rise of the Nazi Party
The antisemitic National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), commonly referred to as the
Nazi Party, received only 2.6 of votes in the May 1928 election to the German Reichstag. In the wake
of the Great Depression, the party’s vote share rose to 37.3 percent in the July 1932 election. In
the following election in November 1932, the Nazi’s vote share declined to 33.1 percent, and many
political observers predicted a gradual decline of the Nazi movement (see for example Enderis 1933,
a New York Times article published on January 1, 1933). Despite the declining vote share of his
party, a political vacuum allowed Hitler to become chancellor on January 30, 1933. In the following
eects on rms. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) report that stock returns declined when the Norwegian gender quota for
corporate boards was rst discussed, but Nygaard (2011) documents positive returns and Eckbo et al. (2016) nd no
signicant eect on returns when the quota became mandatory. For small and young startups in Norway, Becker and
Hvide (2017) report that the death of the founding entrepreneur reduced growth of the startup.
10Intermarriage between Jews and Christians increased from 8.4 percent in 1901 to 29.9 percent in 1915. Baptisms of
Jewish men jumped from 8.4 percent in 1901 to 21 percent in 1918 (Elon 2003, p. 229). These numbers were presumably
higher during the Weimar Republic and in particular among the economic elite.
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months and years, the Nazi government started a host of measures targeting Jews that ultimately
culminated in the Holocaust.
1.3 “Aryanizations” of Stock-Market Listed Firms
The Nazi government did not pass any laws that explicitly forced private rms to dismiss Jewish
employees before 1938. Nonetheless, many Jewish managers lost their positions as early as 1933,
because of the rise of antisemitism.11 As the dismissals were not guided by formal rules, the “forced
resignation of Jews from the boards of (...) enterprises (...) was a gradual process eected with
widely diering degrees of dignity and consideration” (Mosse 1987, p. 376). Many listed rms
exploited laws and events that did not directly aect them to remove Jewish managers. For example,
the law specifying the dismissal of Jewish civil servants of April 7, 1933 applied only to managers
in rms that were majority-owned by the state (Münzel 2006, pp. 126-128). Some privately owned
rms nevertheless used the law as a pretext to dismiss Jewish managers.
In the following years, more and more Jewish managers were forced out of their rms. By
1938, virtually all Jewish managers had left their rms, sometimes because non-Jews saw the po-
litical situation as an opportunity to further their own careers by pushing Jews out or because
Jewish managers migrated abroad to escape rising discrimination.12 Following the ordinance on
the “Elimination of Jews from the German Economy” from November 12, 1938, all joint stock rms
were forced to dismiss remaining Jewish board members to avoid being liquidated (Benz 1988, pp.
324).
The timing of the actual removal of the Jewish managers may have been endogenous to rm
performance, as rms tend to dismiss managers when rms are performing poorly (Murphy and
Zimmerman 1993; Denis and Denis 1995; Hayes and Schaefer 1999; Fee et al. 2013; Jenter and
Lewellen 2017). We therefore use variation in the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 as the treat-
ment variable in our analysis.
Our newly collected data on managers in all German rms that were listed in Berlin show how
the loss of Jewish managers aected rms. We nd that Jews were over-represented among senior
managers relative to their population share of 0.8 percent. Jews held between 15 percent and 16
percent of senior management positions in 1928 and 1932 (Figure 1). By the end of 1933, the fraction
11The racist neologism “Aryanization” was coined during the 1930s. In the historical literature the term “Aryaniza-
tion” is used as a synonym for the exclusion of Jews from the German economy (see Bajohr 2002, p. 11, for a discussion
of the term). In particular, the term is used for three dierent types of discriminatory measures against Jews: rst, the
removal of Jews from senior management positions in large German rms (Münzel 2006); second, the forced sale or
liquidation of smaller Jewish rms (Bajohr 2002, Kreutzmüller 2017); and third, discrimination against Jewish rms by
customers, suppliers, and/or the government. In this paper we focus on the rst type of “Aryanization.”
12Of the approximately 522,000 German Jews, around 304,000 managed to emigrate before the beginning of World
War II (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum 2017). The main destinations of Jewish managers were the United
States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France (Münzel 2006, p. 246). Most of the rest were
brutally murdered in concentration camps. Victims included the former Commerzbank executives Albert Katzenel-
lenbogen and Ludwig Berliner and the former Leonhard Tietz AG executive Franz Baumann. Very few survived the
Holocaust in Germany.
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of Jewish managers had fallen by about one third. By 1938, virtually no Jewish managers remained
in rms that were listed in Berlin.
1.4 The Berlin Stock Exchange
The Berlin Stock Exchange was by far the largest stock exchange in 1930s Germany and one of the
largest in the world, at the level of the stock exchanges in London or Paris. It generated about 66
percent of nancial transaction tax revenue in Germany. Most major German rms were listed in
Berlin. The next-largest German stock exchanges generated 12 percent (Frankfurt) and 9 percent
(Hamburg) of transaction tax revenue (Gömmel and Pohl 1992, p. 179). The evidence in Ferguson
and Voth (2008) and our results on the stock prices of “Jewish rms” in Section 4.1 below show
that stock prices adjusted quickly and in predictable ways to the release of new information. This
suggests that we can use stock prices from 1930s Berlin to meaningfully measure the impact of
removing the Jewish managers.
2 Data
2.1 Data on Senior Managers of Listed Firms
Data on Managers
One contribution of this paper is to construct a comprehensive new database that contains the
names and characteristics of all senior managers of German rms listed on the Berlin Stock Ex-
change in 1932. We collect the data using a range of historical sources. The 1932 edition of the
Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften contains information on all senior managers (execu-
tive and supervisory board members) of German joint stock rms. We extract information for all
rms that were listed in Berlin in 1932.13 The 655 rms in our sample employed 4,873 senior man-
agers, holding a total of 7,791 positions in 1932 (Table 1).14 We collect similar data for the years 1928,
1933, and 1938 from the respective volumes of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, as
detailed in Data Appendix B.1.
Identifying Jewish Managers
The Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften does not report information on the Jewish origin
of managers. We therefore consult multiple additional sources to identify Jewish managers. Münzel
13In 1932, a total of 784 stocks were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. The Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften reports only information on German rms, so we exclude 25 stocks of foreign rms. We also exclude eight
stocks for which the Handbuch does not report board members and two stocks that were never traded in our sample
period. A total of 41 rms issued multiple stocks (for example Hermes Kreditversicherungsbank A.G. issued two stocks),
so we choose the most frequently traded stock for these rms. Of the remaining 708 rms, we exclude 16 stocks of
rms in liquidation and 37 stocks of rms that merged with other rms during our sample period.
14Some managers held multiple positions because they could hold both executive and supervisory board positions
in the same rm, or executive positions and/or supervisory positions in multiple rms.
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(2006) lists Jewish managers in the 300 largest joint stock rms and Windolf (2011) compiles a list of
Jewish managers in German rms. The Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration
nach 1933 contains short biographies of Jewish business people who emigrated from Nazi Germany.
Köhler (2008) studies private bankers of Jewish origin. For managers who did not appear in these
sources, we conduct a manual search in the online database World Biographical Information System
(WBIS). The database combines information from various collections of biographies, for example
Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA) and Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA), which allow us
to infer whether a manager was of Jewish origin. Finally, we hand-check all managers who did
not appear in the previous sources by conducting an internet search to nd information on their
religion. Further details on the data collection are in Data Appendix B.1.
We classify managers as Jewish based on who was considered Jewish in Nazi Germany. This
classication includes practicing Jews, such as banker Max Warburg who was active in the Jewish
community of Hamburg. It also includes individuals with Jewish ancestors who had converted to
Christianity, in many cases already during the 19th century; this denition includes, for example,
I.G. Farbenmanager Carl von Weinberg.15 All these managers were forced out of their rms because
of their Jewish ancestry.
Our data show that 423 of 4,873 managers (around 9 percent) were individuals of Jewish origin
(Table 1) in 1932. They held 1,230 out of 7,791 manager positions (around 16 percent).16 Using our
data, we show that already in 1933 one third of the Jewish managers were dismissed from their
positions and by 1938 virtually all Jewish managers had been dismissed (Figure 1).
Characteristics of Managers
We extract information on the characteristics of managers for the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938
from the respective volumes of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, as detailed in Data
Appendix B.1.2. Overall, we collect data on 29,834 manager positions for these four years. Table 1
summarizes the manager characteristics for 1932, the year before the Nazis came to power. While
about 1 percent of the relevant age cohorts were studying at a university at the turn of the century
(Windolf 1990), 36 percent of managers held a university degree. This gure was even higher for
Jewish managers, 45 percent of whom held a university degree. Similarly, Jewish managers were
more likely to hold the honorary title of Kommerzienrat (8.8 versus 4.3 percent). This title was
granted by the German Emperor to individuals who made outstanding contributions to society. It
is roughly comparable to the honors system of the United Kingdom today.17 The greater prevalence
15This approach follows the denition of the historical literature on Jews in the Germany economy (see for example
the discussions in Mosse 1987 and Münzel 2006, pp. 80-92).
16This fraction is identical to the one reported by Windolf (2011) in his historical study about the German-Jewish
economic elite.
17Businessmen could apply for the title of Kommerzienrat. A rigorous selection process based on wealth, income,
public service, charitable activities, and standing among peers ensured that only the most successful businessmen
were awarded the coveted title (for more information see Mosse, 1987, pp. 3). In 1919, the German Reich ocially
discontinued the awards but most individuals who had been awarded the title continued to list it in ocial documents.
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of academic and honorary recognition among the Jewish managers suggests that they had higher
general human capital than other managers.
Jewish managers had longer tenure in their rms, measured by whether they had already held
a manager position in the same rm in 1928 (70.9 versus 61.8 percent). Similarly, they had more
general managerial experience, as measured by whether they had already held a manager position
in any of the sample rms in 1928 (83.0 versus 68.3 percent). Finally, Jewish managers were also
better connected to other rms, as demonstrated by the greater number of supervisory board po-
sitions (2.9 versus 1.1) in other rms. The dierences between Jewish and non-Jewish managers
were not driven by the types of rms that they worked for. Compared to their non-Jewish col-
leagues in the same rms, Jewish managers held more academic and honorary titles, had longer
tenure, greater experience, and more connections to other rms (see Table 1, column 4). Overall,
the statistics suggests that Jewish managers were exceptional along a number of dimensions.18
2.2 Data on Stock Prices
We manually digitize stock prices from historical listings (calledBörse undWirtschaft, laterMonatskurs-
blatt Berliner Börse) of the Berlin Stock Exchange (see Data Appendix B.2.1 for details). We record
more than 240,000 daily stock prices for the universe of German rms listed in Berlin, for the
months January and July of the years 1929 to 1943.19
Some stocks, especially those of smaller rms, were not traded every day. We therefore average
stock prices in a plus and minus 10-day window around January 10th and July 10th of each year.20
Between 1929 and 1943, the stocks of some rms were consolidated. For example, Dresdner Bank
stocks were consolidated on August 4, 1932, at an old-stock:new-stock ratio of 10:3. As a result,
the reported stock price increased by 333 percent. We account for these consolidations by dividing
all stock prices by the consolidation ratio (3.333 in our example) after each consolidation. Between
1929 and 1943, some rms issued new stocks and oered existing shareholders a subscription right
to prevent stock dilution. We also adjust stock prices for mechanical drops after the deduction
18There are two factors that could explain the exceptional characteristics of Jewish managers. First, discrimination
against Jews may have been prevalent even before 1933 and thus Jews would have had to be exceptional to be hired as
managers. Second, a large literature has highlighted the exceptional human capital of German Jews and, in particular,
the entrepreneurial culture that ourished in the German Jewish community (for example, Botticini and Eckstein 2007,
2012). In the 15th and 16th centuries, Jews were barred from entering many professions and therefore concentrated
their economic activity on trade and banking (Elon 2003, pp. 21). In the 18th and the early 19th centuries, many Jewish
manufacturing rms were founded by individuals who had traded such goods in the past (Mosse 1987, pp. 55-56). The
entrepreneurial spirit exhibited by many Jews contributed to the lasting success of Jews in manager-run businesses
(Ziegler 2000).
19The German banking crisis led to the closure of the Berlin Stock Exchange between September 1931, and April 12,
1932. For 1932, we therefore use stock prices for April and October. The results are robust to dropping all observations
for 1932 (Table A.8, columns 1-2).
20The results are robust to averaging stock prices in a plus-minus three-day or plus-minus ve-day window around
January 10th and July 10th or to averaging stock prices for all days of January and July (see Table A.8).
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of subscription rights by multiplying subsequent stock prices by the corresponding adjustment
factor.21
2.3 Data on Dividend Payments
We manually digitize the dividend payments of the sample rms from the listings of the Berlin Stock
Exchange and from the 1935 and 1941 editions of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften
(see Appendix B.2.2 for details).
2.4 Data on Returns on Assets
We also digitize data on rms’ returns on assets from the 1932 and 1941 editions of theHandbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. The return on assets is the ratio of prots before interest payments
and taxes to total assets. The data are for the years 1931, 1936, and 1940. Many rms do not report
all income statement and balance sheet items that are required for the calculation of the return on
assets. As a result, the data allow us to calculate the return on assets for 289 rms (see Appendix
B.2.4 for details).
2.5 Data on Control Variables
Finally, we collect data on various rm-level control variables measured in 1932. We obtain con-
nections of managers to the Nazi Party from Ferguson and Voth (2008). The measure indicates
whether any of the rms’ managers made nancial contributions or provided political support to
Hitler, Göring, or the Nazi Party. We also collect data on nominal capital, industry classications22,
and rm age from the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1932). Finally, we collect data
on the period during which the balance sheet is reported from Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse.
2.6 Summary Statistics on Firms
Table 2 summarizes the rm data for the year 1932. The average rm employed roughly 12 senior
managers in 1932, of which 14 percent were of Jewish origin (column 1). The average rm with
at least one Jewish manager employed about three Jewish managers in 1932, corresponding to a
fraction of Jewish managers of 22 percent (column 3).
We present statistics for all rms (column 1), rms without Jewish managers (column 2), and
rms with at least one Jewish manager (columns 3-7). This allows us to assess to what extent
rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were dierent from other rms. We rst compare
rms without Jewish managers (column 2) to rms with at least one Jewish manager (column
21See Appendix B.2.1 for details. The adjustment of stock prices for stock consolidations and subscription rights
is standard practice in the construction of long-run stock indices (see, for example, Ronge 2002, p. 58). The results
without these adjustments are almost identical to the results reported in the paper.
22The industry classications are: nancial services, insurance, transport, mining/iron/steel, machinery/electronics,
construction/stones/earth, textile/clothing, chemistry/paper/wood, food/drinks, and other (consisting mainly of re-
tail/trade/energy provision).
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3). Both types of rms were on average of similar age and reported their nancial statements at
similar times. But the two sets of rms diered on other characteristics. Since Jewish managers
were exceptionally qualied, the average rm with Jewish managers had more qualied managers,
as measured by managers with tenure in the rm, general experience, university degrees, and
connections. Perhaps surprisingly, the average rm with Jewish managers was more connected to
the Nazi Party. This can be explained by the fact that rms with highly qualied managers were
more connected to politicians. Furthermore, the average rm with at least one Jewish manager was
larger, both measured by the number of senior managers and by the nominal capital of the rm.
There are two reasons for this. First, the probability of employing a Jewish manager increases
mechanically with the number of managers and second, the exceptional characteristics of Jewish
managers allowed them to manage larger rms.23
Throughout our analysis below, we account for dierences between rms with and without
Jewish managers using several approaches. First, all regressions include a full set of rm xed
eects that control for permanent dierences across rms. Hence, our identication strategy does
not require that rms were similar on observables in 1932. It only requires that rms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers would have evolved in parallel to other rms had the Jewish man-
agers not been dismissed. We present evidence in support of this assumption below. For example,
we show that the stock prices of rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were following
parallel trends to rms without Jewish managers before 1933.
To further strengthen our identication strategy, we control for potential shocks to rms with
dierent characteristics by using a wide range of control variables interacted with full sets of time
xed eects. For instance, controls for connections to the Nazi Party or various controls for rm
size (nominal capital and the total number of managers) do not signicantly change our estimates
(Appendix Table A.7, columns 1-3). We also construct subsamples where rm characteristics are
similar. We consistently nd that the eects of interest do not vary in these subsamples. For
instance, we show that the eects are similar in samples with only small and only large rms
(Appendix Table A.7, columns 5-6).
In robustness checks, we estimate results in samples of rms that all had at least one Jewish
manager. Conditional on having at least one Jewish manager, rms with a higher fraction of Jewish
managers were similar to rms with a lower fraction of Jewish managers (Table 2, columns 4-5).
The rms look particularly similar along all observable characteristics if we exclude conglomerate
rms from our sample (columns 6-7). Conglomerates had extremely high nominal capital. The two
conglomerates in our sample were the national railroads Reichsbahn and the chemical producer
I.G. Farben. Both had a positive but low fraction of Jewish managers.
23The large dierence in average nominal capital is predominately driven by two conglomerate rms: the national
railroads Reichsbahn and the chemical producer I.G. Farben. Conglomerates were large rms composed of formerly
independent companies that operated under one management in 1932. Without these two rms, the average nominal
capital of rms with at least one Jewish manager was 16.31 million Reichsmark (RM).
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3 The Eect of Losing Jewish Managers on the Characteris-
tics of Firms’ Senior Management
This section presents the rst set of main results. We analyze how the removal of Jewish man-
agers aected the overall characteristics of rms’ senior management. For this analysis, we use
data on manager characteristics for the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. This approach allows us
to investigate eects on characteristics until 1938, when virtually no Jewish managers remained in
their rms.
Our empirical strategy compares changes in manager characteristics in rms that had employed
Jewish managers in 1932, and lost them after the Nazi government took power in January 1933, to
changes in rms that had not employed Jewish managers. We estimate the eects by running the
following specication:
loд(Characteristicit ) =
1938∑
τ=1928
βτ Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × 1 [t (i) = τ ] (1)
+ FirmFEi + YearFEt + ϵit .
The outcome variable is the log of a certain manager characteristic in rm i in year t , for example
the log of the number of managers with a university degree in rm i in year t .24
Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i measures the fraction of Jewish managers in rm i in 1932.
It is interacted with indicator variables for 1928, 1933, and 1938. The interaction with the indicator
for 1932 is excluded from the regression so that the coecients are estimated relative to 1932, the
last year before the Nazis came to power. FirmFEi is a full set of rm xed eects and YearFEt is
a full set of year eects (for 1928, 1933, and 1938). To account for potential correlation of standard
errors within rms, we cluster standard errors at the rm level.
We plot the yearly coecients and the corresponding 95 percent condence intervals in Figure
2. The rst outcome variable is a measure for rm tenure, i.e., the number of managers who had
been working as managers in the same rm since 1928. From 1932 to 1933, rms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 experienced a sharp decline in the number of managers with
tenure since 1928, relative to rms without Jewish managers (Figure 2, panel a). The drop continued
until 1938 when virtually all Jewish managers had been dismissed (see Figure 1). For both 1933
and 1938, the dierence between rms that lost Jewish managers and other rms is statistically
signicant, relative to their 1932 values. This nding is not surprising, because once a manager with
tenure is expelled, nding a replacement with the same length of tenure in the rm is impossible.
24A small number of rms report zeros on some of the outcome variables, so we cannot include them in specications
using the log outcome variable. Appendix Table A.1 reports robustness checks using the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation, which is an approximation to the log transformation that permits using zero values. The results are
almost identical.
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The second outcome variable is a measure for experience, i.e., the number of managers who
held a manager position in any of the sample rms in 1928. Firms could have compensated for the
loss of an experienced Jew by hiring a manager who had experience running another rm. The
results show that rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 experienced a statistically
signicant decline in the number of experienced managers, relative to other rms (panel b). This
suggests that the rms did not replace the dismissed Jewish managers with other managers of
similar experience.25
We also examine whether rms compensated for the loss of Jewish managers who held a uni-
versity degree. We nd that rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 employed
fewer managers with a university degree after 1933 (panel c). The dierence between rms with a
higher fraction of Jewish managers and rms without Jewish managers is statistically signicant
in 1938. Hence, rms did not replace the highly educated Jewish managers with similarly educated
non-Jews.
The remaining panels analyze the eect of losing Jewish managers on the connections of man-
agers. We measure connections as the total number of supervisory board positions in other rms
held by managers of a rm. These connections are measured contemporaneously, i.e., to measure
connections in 1933 we only use an individual’s supervisory board positions in 1933. Total con-
nections (panel d), connections to rms in the same industry (panel e), and connections to rms
in other industries (panel f) dropped sharply and signicantly in 1933. They remained low until
1938. This shows that rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 did not compensate
for the loss of well-connected managers after 1933.
We test the robustness of the graphical analysis by estimating the following dierences-in-
dierences specication:
loд(Characteristicit ) = β1 Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × Post 1933t (2)
+ FirmFEi + YearFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit ,
where Post 1933t is an indicator variable that is equal to one for all years after 1932, and zero other-
wise. Controlsit is a vector of rm-level control variables, described in detail below. We measure all
controls in 1932, and interact them with year xed eects, to ensure the control variables cannot
endogenously respond to the removal of the Jewish managers.
Table 3 presents the results for all manager characteristics, using one panel for each outcome
variable. The specications reported in column 1 control for rm and year xed eects. The co-
ecients on the interaction of the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 with a post-1933 indicator
are negative and signicant for all outcome variables, consistent with the graphical evidence. The
25There was a signicant degree of turnover in senior manager positions, so rms were in principle able to nd new
managers. For example, 37 percent of senior managers in 1932 were not employed in the same rm in 1928, and 30
percent had not held a senior management position in any of the sample rms in 1928 (Table 1).
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average rm with Jewish managers in 1932 lost 22 percent of its managers after the Nazis came
to power. The point estimate in column 1 of panel A therefore implies that the average rm with
Jewish managers experienced a decline in the number of managers with tenure since 1928 of ap-
proximately 18 log points.
The specications reported in column 2 additionally control for connections to the Nazi Party,
interacted with year xed eects, to ensure that the dierential treatment of connected rms by
the Nazis cannot explain the results. The point estimates remain essentially unchanged. We also
add control variables for the timing of a rm’s publication of nancial statements (column 3), for
rm age (column 4), and for the rm’s nominal capital (column 5). All controls are interacted with
a full set of year xed eects. The coecients remain signicant and stable, suggesting that the
ndings cannot be explained by shocks that are correlated with rms’ reporting schedule, age, or
size. The specications reported in column 6 add 10 industry xed eects, interacted with a full
set of year xed eects. The industry xed eects account for potential shocks that may have hit
dierent industries in dierent years. The coecients remain negative and signicant.
We also estimate results with an alternative treatment variable, a binary indicator for whether
the rm had any Jewish managers in 1932. The results using the indicator are quantitatively close
to the results using the fraction as treatment variable (Appendix Table A.2). For instance, column
1 reports that the average rm with Jewish managers experienced a decline in the number of man-
agers with tenure since 1928 of approximately 23 log points, compared to 18 log points implied by
the fraction treatment in Table 3. The point estimates are similar when we add the control vari-
ables. All coecients remain signicantly dierent from zero in the specications with the full set
of controls (column 6).
Taken together, the evidence from Figure 2 and Tables 3 and A.2 shows that the removal of
Jewish managers had a lasting impact on the characteristics of managers at rms that had employed
Jewish managers in 1932. In 1938, these rms still had fewer managers with rm-specic tenure,
general managerial experience, a university degree, and fewer connections to other rms. The
persistent decline in these manager characteristics up to 1938 is noteworthy, because rms had up
to ve years to replace the Jewish managers after 1933.26
There are three possible interpretations of these results. First, managers may have all the bar-
gaining power in wage negotiations with the rm or the managerial labor market may be perfectly
competitive, with only a small role for rm-specic human capital. In both cases, rms have to
fully compensate managers for their marginal product, rm value is independent of managerial
characteristics, and rms have no incentive to hire managers with similar characteristics. Under
this interpretation, the loss of Jewish managers would not have aected rm value.
26Appendix Table A.3 shows that the decrease in manager characteristics was not primarily a result of a lower
number of managers overall. There is little evidence that the number of managers evolved dierently at aected rms,
relative to rms without Jewish managers.
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Second, the manager characteristics we analyze may be benecial to rm value. Tenure is likely
associated with rm-specic human capital, while experience and a university education are likely
associated with general human capital. Firm-specic human capital generates rents for the em-
ployer in standard models (Becker 1964). General human capital can benet the employer if there
are information frictions on managerial labor markets (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Dessein and
Prat 2018). The number of connections could proxy for a manager’s quality, since only reputable
managers may be oered multiple board positions. In addition, managers with many connections
could improve information ows to providers of inputs and outputs, and ease collusion among
competitors. Despite the benets, frictions on the labor market for managers may have left rms
unable to adequately replace the Jewish managers. Under this second interpretation, the loss of
the Jewish managers would have harmed rm value.
A third interpretation views the characteristics we analyze as detrimental to rm value. Highly
educated and experienced managers may be more skilled at becoming entrenched and extracting
rents from their employers (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Managers with many connections may be
busier, and hence may enforce weaker corporate governance (Fich and Shivdasani 2006). They may
also have an incentive to seek rents for the other rms they serve. Even if the detrimental nature
of these characteristics were known, rms may not choose to endogenously re their managers,
because ring signals to investors that the rm is performing poorly or because ring managers
is costly. Under this third interpretation, rms had no incentive to hire managers with similar
characteristics in place of the Jewish managers. The exogenous removal of the Jewish managers
may have raised rm value.
The following section allows us to dierentiate between the three interpretations. We analyze
how rm stock market performance responded to the removal of the Jewish managers. Subse-
quently, we test whether any of the manager characteristics were particularly benecial or harmful
to the stock market performance of rms.
4 The Eect of Losing Jewish Managers on Stock Prices
4.1 The Average Eect on Stock Prices
In this section, we investigate the eect on stock prices. We estimate the following regression:
loд(Stock Priceit ) =
1943.5∑
τ=1929.0
βτ Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × 1 [t (i) = τ ] (3)
+ FirmFEi +TimeFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit .
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The specication is similar to the previous section, but uses the log of the stock price as the outcome
variable.27 As explained in Section 2, we have two observations of the stock price for each rm
i per year, around January 10th and July 10th. The data cover the years from 1929 to 1943.28 We
exclude January 10, 1933 as the last observation before Hitler became Chancellor on January 30,
1933. We plot the estimated coecients βτ and the 95 percent condence intervals in Figure 3.
Panel a shows the coecients of a specication with a full set of rm and time xed eects. Panel
b plots the coecients of a specication that further controls for connections to the Nazi Party,
reporting period, rm age, nominal capital, and industry xed eects, all measured in 1932 and
interacted with a full set of time xed eects.
The main identifying assumption is that the stock prices of rms with a higher fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932 would have followed the same trend as the stock prices of rms without
Jewish managers, if Jewish managers had not been expelled from their rms. Before January 1933,
the coecients on the fraction of Jewish managers are small and not signicantly dierent from
zero. This indicates that the stock prices of rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were
on similar time trends while the Jewish managers were still at their rms. Firms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers were not exposed to dierent shocks before 1933, in line with our
identication assumption.
After January 1933, the trends diverged. The stock price of the average rm with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers started to decline sharply, compared to the stock price of a rm without
Jewish managers.29 Interestingly, our estimated short-run eect of losing Jewish managers is close
to the initial stock price responses to prominent manager exits in recent times. For example, after
Apple CEO Steve Jobs took permanent medical leave in 2011, the Apple stock fell by 6 percent (BBC
27The results of this section focus on stock price changes, without incorporating dividend payments into the analysis.
We examine the eect of losing Jewish managers on dividends separately in Section 6.1, nding a negative eect. In
an additional robustness check, we adjust the stock prices for dividends, assuming that investors immediately reinvest
the dividend into the stock (see Appendix B.2.3 for details), and re-estimate equation (3). The adjustment means that
the coecients measure the eect of losing Jewish managers on the return of investing (on January 10, 1933) into the
average rm with Jewish managers in 1932, relative to investing into a rm without Jewish managers in 1932. We use
the adjusted stock prices to construct Appendix Figure A.2. The pattern over time is almost identical to Figure 3. The
point estimate corresponding to Table 4, column 6 using the adjusted stock prices is -0.475 (0.152). The more negative
coecient is consistent with the nding that rms that lost Jewish managers paid out lower dividends after 1933.
28As we have two observations per year, the data contain 30 time periods. Time xed eects do not refer to years
but refer to January 10th and July 10th of each year, i.e., there are two time xed eects per year, 29 time xed eects
overall.
29The stock price of the average rm with Jewish managers declined by 7.1 log points between January and July
1933 (Figure 3, panel b). The sharp decline is consistent with the timing of events described in the historical literature.
For example, Münzel (2006) documents that “from the very start” of the Nazi reign there was “radical pressure on elite
managers of Jewish origin”, with “more than a third of Jewish executives losing their positions” by July 1933. Similarly,
our manager data show that the average rm had lost 34 percent of the Jewish managers it would lose by 1938. The
point estimate on the stock price in July 1933 amounts to 51 percent of the July 1938 point estimate. The dierence
between the fraction of managers lost and drop in stock prices may be explained by the sharp decline in the number of
connected managers in 1933, as documented in Figure 2. We show that losing connected managers led to larger eects
in Section 4.2 below.
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2011). When Fiat Chrysler CEO Sergio Marchionne stepped down due to surgery in 2018, the Fiat
Chrysler stock lost 5 percent (Reuters 2018).
The eects of losing Jewish managers persisted until the end of our stock sample period. The
specication with the full set of controls suggests that in January 1943, 10 years after the Nazis
had come to power, the stock price of an average rm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932
(which lost 22 percent of its managers) was still 11.6 log points below that of a comparable rm
that had not employed any Jewish managers. The individual point estimate for January 1943 is
signicantly dierent from zero at the 1 percent level, as are all of the point estimates from July
1933 onward. The results are similar with and without the controls, strengthening the view that
rms with Jewish managers were not fundamentally dierent from other rms, except for losing
Jewish managers.
We also estimate results with the following dierences-in-dierences specication:
loд(Stock Priceit ) = β1 Fraction Jewish Manaдers (1932)i × Post 1933t (4)
+ FirmFEi +TimeFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit ,
The regressor of interest is the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for
the months after January 1933. The point estimate in the specication with only rm and time xed
eects is signicant at the 1 percent level (Table 4, column 1). The point estimate indicates that after
the Nazis came to power, the stock price of the average rm that had employed Jewish managers
was 10.3 log points lower after 1933, compared to the stock price of rms that had not employed
any Jewish managers.30 The addition of the controls in the subsequent columns hardly aects the
coecient. In particular, we control for an indicator for a connection to the Nazi party, an indicator
for reporting company results in January, rm age, and nominal capital, all interacted with a full
set of time eects (columns 1-5). Furthermore, we control for a set of 10 industry xed eects, all
interacted with a full set of time eects (column 6). The eect remains stable and signicant even if
it is estimated from within-industry variation in the share of Jewish managers in 1932. This oers
further evidence that dierential exposure to other shocks cannot explain the eect.
By comparing the 1932 and 1933 editions of Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, we
can identify which rms lost some of their Jewish managers already in 1933 and which rms lost
Jewish managers only after 1933. We estimate how this dierential timing aected stock prices.
Firms that lost some of their Jewish managers in 1933 experienced lower stock prices in 1933 (Ap-
pendix Table A.4, rst row of coecients). In the following years, when these rms lost the re-
maining Jewish managers, their stock price declined somewhat further (second row of coecients).
Firms that lost all their Jewish managers after 1933 experienced no decline in stock prices in 1933
30In the average rm that had employed Jewish managers in 1932, about 22 percent of managers were Jewish. Hence,
the estimates imply a decline in stock price for the average rm with Jewish managers of 0.469 * 0.22 * 100 = 10.3 log
points.
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(third row of coecients), but experienced lower stock prices after 1933 (fourth row of coecients).
This suggests that the sharp decline in stock prices in 1933 (seen in Figure 3) was entirely driven
by rms that lost managers in 1933. Of course, this result should be interpreted with caution,
since Jewish managers may have left their rms for endogenous reasons. For this reason we use
the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 as the treatment variable in the baseline specications.
The fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is immune to endogenous timing decisions of manager
separations. 31
We alternatively measure the rm’s exposure to Jewish managers using a binary indicator for
whether the rm employed any Jewish managers in 1932 (Appendix Table A.5). After 1933, rms
with Jewish managers experienced a decline in stock prices of 14.7 log points, an eect that is
comparable to the result using the fraction treatment. The addition of the control variables hardly
aects the point estimate.
The persistent eects of losing Jewish managers on stock prices are consistent with the per-
sistent eects on the characteristics of senior managers found in the previous section. The stock
price results support the view that rms had gained rents from employing the Jewish managers,
and, hence, that the managers’ salaries did not reect their marginal contribution to their rms’
market value. Frictions in the labor market presumably left rms unable to replace managers with
certain characteristics, and this persistently lowered their stock market valuation. Next, we con-
duct a number of robustness checks. We subsequently turn to assessing whether rms that lost
certain managerial characteristics suered larger stock price declines.
Robustness
In the rst robustness check, we estimate intensive margin eects, using a sample of rms that
all employed at least one Jewish manager in 1932. In this sample, the observable characteristics
of rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers were similar to rms with a lower fraction of
Jewish managers (see Table 2, columns 4-5). We nd that the coecient on the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932 in this sample is of similar magnitude but slightly smaller than in the full sample,
and signicant at the 10 percent level (Appendix Table A.6, columns 1-2). Firms with a higher
fraction of Jewish managers were particularly similar to rms with a lower fraction of Jewish
managers if we additionally exclude the two conglomerate rms from our sample: the national
railroads Reichsbahn and the chemical producer I.G. Farben (see Table 2, columns 6-7 and Section
2.6). If we use only rms with at least one Jewish manager and exclude the two conglomerates, the
coecient on the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is of similar magnitude to the full sample
31Our data on the composition of rm management cover the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938 (see Figure 1) We
can therefore explore the exact timing of dismissals by investigating changes between 1932 and 1933 but not for the
subsequent years until 1938. By 1938, virtually all Jewish managers had left their rms (Figure 1, last bar). While the
results above suggest that the stock market reacted sharply to the timing of dismissals for the rst wave of dismissals,
the later dismissals may have been more anticipated and hence the dismissal of all Jewish managers seems to have
been priced in by 1937 (see Figure 3, panel b).
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and signicant at the 5 percent level (Appendix Table A.6, columns 3-4). These intensive margin
results show that dierences between rms with and without Jewish managers do not drive the
eect of losing Jewish managers.
We also nd that various ways to control for rm size do not aect the ndings, including
parametric and non-parametric controls for nominal capital, for the total number of managers, and
for both variables simultaneously (Appendix Table A.7, columns 1-3). There is no heterogeneity in
the eects by rm size (Appendix Table A.7, columns 4-6). The estimated eect is slightly larger, in
absolute magnitude, if we drop observations from 1932, suggesting that dierential shocks during
the stock market closure cannot explain our ndings (Appendix Table A.8, columns 1-2). For the
baseline results, we average stock prices in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and
July 10th of each year. The results are robust to averaging stock prices in time windows of plus-
minus ve or three days around the respective dates (Appendix Table A.8, columns 3-6). Finally,
the results are robust to averaging stock prices for the whole month of January and July of each
year (Appendix Table A.8, columns 7-8).
Some rms were not traded in the plus-minus 10 day window around each January 10th and
July 10th, either because the stocks were relatively illiquid, or because rms were no longer listed
on the Berlin Stock Exchange. The results are robust to restricting the sample to regularly traded
rms and become even larger, in absolute magnitude, if we restrict the sample to rms without
any missing observations (Appendix Table A.9).
We investigate whether rms that lost Jewish managers were more likely to be delisted from
the stock market. We regress an indicator for whether the rm was delisted after January 1933
on the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. The coecient is negative, small, and insignicant,
indicating that rms with Jewish managers were not more likely to be delisted (Appendix Table
A.10, column 1). The results are similar if we add the full set of control variables (column 2), or if
we estimate an extended Cox hazard model (columns 3-4).
Appendix Table A.11 explores whether the eects depend on the role of the Jewish managers.
We dene important managers as executive board members and the chair and vice chair of the
supervisory board. Regular managers are the other members of the supervisory board.32 The
point estimate for losing managers in important positions is slightly larger than the point esti-
mate for losing managers in regular positions. However, the estimates are close in magnitude and
not statistically dierent, suggesting that losing managers in both types of positions aects rm
performance.
32The supervisory board was actively involved in the management of the rm in the 1930s. Firm founders often held
the chairs and vice chairs of the supervisory board. Until the late 19th century, the supervisory board had been the
main decision maker in German rms. After a revision of commercial law in 1884, German executive board members
became gradually more important in decision-making (Münzel, 2006, p. 43).
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4.2 The Eect of Losing Managers with Certain Characteristics on Stock
Prices
To investigate whether the loss of certain managerial characteristics was responsible for the decline
in stock prices, we estimate the following specication:
loд(Stock Priceit ) = β1 · 1[0 < Characteristic Lost due to Losinд Jewish Manaдers < 0.20]i × Post 1933t
+ β2 · 1[0.20 ≤ Characteristic Lost due to Losinд Jewish Manaдers < 0.80]i × Post 1933t
+ β3 · 1[0.80 ≤ Characteristic Lost due to Losinд Jewish Manaдers]i × Post 1933t
+ FirmFEi +TimeFEt + βc Controlsit + ϵit .
(5)
As before, the outcome variable is the log stock price. The three main explanatory variables are
indicators for whether in 1932 Jewish managers were responsible for 1) less than 20 percent, 2)
20 percent to 80 percent, or 3) more than 80 percent of a given managerial characteristic (such
as connections to other rms). To be clear, if a rm did not lose any Jewish managers, the three
indicator variables are zero, so that the coecients on the three indicator variables are estimated
relative to a rm that did not employ any Jewish managers in 1932. The three indicator variables
are all interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933.33
We start by examining the eect of losing connections to other rms. After 1933, stock prices
declined by 11.4 log points (signicant at the 10 percent level) in rms that lost Jewish managers
but did not lose more than 20 percent of the rm’s connections (Table 5, column 1), relative to
rms without Jewish managers in 1932. Stock prices declined by 14.4 log points (signicant at the
1 percent level) in rms where the Jewish managers were responsible for 20 percent to less than 80
percent of the rm’s connections, and by 36.6 log points (signicant at the 1 percent level) in rms
where the Jewish managers were responsible for more than 80 percent of the rm’s connections,
relative to rms without Jewish managers in 1932.34 The results suggest that rms that lost a large
share of their managerial connections suered larger declines in stock prices. In line with other
33One concern could be that all rms that lost a larger share of a given characteristic also lost a larger fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932. In that case, the indicator variables might simply proxy for rms that lost a high share of
Jewish managers. To test this concern, we ran specications where in addition to the three indicator variables, we
include the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The
coecient on the fraction is statistically insignicant and positive, while the coecients on the indicator variables
remain at the same signicance levels and of similar magnitude to the results presented in this section. This implies
that the indicator variables are not simply proxies for a high fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, but that they capture
additional variation in the characteristics of Jewish managers.
34In unreported results, we analyzed separately whether the eect is driven by losing managers with within- or
outside-industry connections. The point estimates for both types of connections are of similar magnitude, indicating
that losing both within- and outside industry connections had similar eects.
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recent studies, these ndings imply that social capital matters for rm outcomes, and that it is hard
to replace (Glaeser et al. 2002; Cai and Szeidl 2017; Haselmann et al. 2018).
Next, we study the eect of losing Jewish managers with a university degree. After 1933, stock
prices declined by 5.2 log points (not signicant) in rms that lost Jewish managers but did not
lose more than 20 percent of the rm’s managers with a degree (Table 5, column 3). Stock prices
declined by 21.4 log points (signicant at the 1 percent level) in rms where the Jewish managers
made up 20 percent to less than 80 percent of the rm’s managers with a degree, and by 62.3 log
points (signicant at the 1 percent level) in rms where the Jewish managers made up more than
80 percent of the rm’s managers with a degree. The results indicate that rms that lost a large
share of their highly educated managers suered larger declines in stock prices. The results on
losing larger shares of connections and managers with degrees are robust to the inclusion of the
additional control variables (Table 5, columns 2 and 4).
Last, we study the eect of losing Jewish managers with managerial experience since 1928.
The specication without controls suggests there is a larger eect for rms losing a larger share of
experienced managers (Table 5, column 5). However, the inclusion of the control variables renders
the estimates for losing smaller or larger shares of experienced managers similar (Table 5, column
6). For example, the point estimate on losing over 80 percent of experienced managers is statisti-
cally insignicant and of similar magnitude to the point estimate on losing less than 20 percent of
experienced managers. This suggests that the loss of experienced managers does not account for
most of the average eect of losing Jewish managers.35
To compare the eect of losing dierent manager characteristics more conclusively, we also
estimate specications that simultaneously include the indicator variables for all three character-
istics. These specications estimate the eect of losing one characteristic, while keeping constant
changes in the other characteristics. Therefore, the results account for potential correlations be-
tween dierent characteristics. For example, managers with many connections may also have
been more educated. The estimates are of similar magnitude compared to the previous specica-
tions (Table 5, columns 7-8). The coecients on losing more than 80 percent of connections and
managers with degrees are statistically signicant with and without the controls. The coecients
on losing larger shares of experienced managers are statistically insignicant with and without
the controls. This implies that the earlier results did not rely on spurious correlations between the
dierent managerial characteristics.36
35In unreported specications, we examine separately whether losing managers with tenure in the rm or managers
with experience in another rms has an eect. We nd little evidence that losing managers with general experience,
rm-specic tenure, or experience in another rm lowered stock prices.
36In unreported results, we vary the denition of the explanatory variables that indicate a greater loss in the man-
agerial characteristics. For example, we use 25 and 75 percent as the cutos, or 50 percent. In all these specications,
the point estimates on losing a larger share of connections and university-educated managers are negative, while the
point estimates on losing any share of experienced managers are small and mostly positive.
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Overall, the results suggest that managers with many connections and university degrees sig-
nicantly contribute to rm value. The ndings are consistent with the view that connections and
education are positively correlated with managerial human capital. There is no clear evidence that
a loss of experienced managers harms rm value, as long as the reduction in managerial experi-
ence is not accompanied by a reduction in the connections and the education level of managers.
This nding could indicate that the positive eects of experience on rm-specic human capital
are outweighed by the negative eects of experience through rent-seeking and entrenchment.
The coecients on rms with Jewish managers that lost less than 20 percent of all three man-
agerial characteristics are positive, close to zero, and statistically insignicant in columns 7 and
8. Hence, losing Jewish managers per se had no signicant eect on stock prices. This is a key
nding, which validates our identication strategy. One may be concerned that rms with Jewish
managers in 1932 suered from other shocks after 1933. Potential shocks that may be correlated
with a higher fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 include, for example, repression by the Nazi
government, dierent exposure to government policies, consumer retail boycotts, a loss of lower-
ranked Jewish employees, or a loss of Jewish customers. But the results in columns 7 and 8 show
that rms with Jewish managers in 1932 and rms with no Jewish managers in 1932 remained on
similar trends after 1933, unless Jewish managers were responsible for a large share of the rm’s
highly educated or connected managers. This suggests that rms with Jewish managers were not
exposed to other shocks after the Nazis came to power, apart from losing managers with certain
characteristics. The following section presents further evidence that other potential shocks to rms
do not account for the eects on stock prices.
4.3 Alternative Explanations for the Eect on Stock Prices
The results in the previous subsections indicate that the removal of connected and educated Jewish
managers led to declines in rms’ stock prices. The absence of an eect for rms that lost neither a
large share of connected nor of educated Jewish managers already suggests that correlated shocks
do not drive the estimated eect of losing Jewish managers. In this section, we further explore
whether the decline in stock prices was driven by the removal of Jewish managers or whether
rms with Jewish managers suered from other shocks after 1933 that were correlated with the
fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. We consider two types of shocks: those resulting from other
discriminatory measures against Jews, and those arising from other shocks to the demand for the
products of some rms.
4.3.1 Other Discrimination Against Jews
Other discriminatory measures against Jews in Nazi Germany may have disproportionately af-
fected rms with a higher fraction of Jewish managers. We explore this possibility with ve tests.
First, we estimate the eect of losing Jewish managers for rms that were favored by the Nazi gov-
ernment. Second, we measure which rms were perceived as “Jewish” and explore how the eect
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of losing Jewish managers changes if we control for post-1933 changes in stock prices of “Jewish”
rms. Third, we analyze eects in sectors and areas with very few lower-ranked Jewish employees.
Fourth, we analyze eects for rms without large Jewish shareholders. Finally, we investigate the
eect of losing managers in a sample of rms that were not aected by antisemitic boycotts in the
retail sector.
Eect in a Sample of Firms Favored by the Nazi Government
In a rst test, we restrict the sample to rms that were favored by the Nazi regime. It is likely that
these rms were not exposed to repressive measures by the Nazi government, but rather experi-
enced political support after 1933. We identify rms favored by the Nazi government based on three
criteria. First, we include rms that had managers who made nancial contributions or provided
political support to Hitler, Göring, or the Nazi Party before 1933. This measure was developed by
Ferguson and Voth (2008). Examples of such rms are the insurance company Allianz and the car
manufacturer Daimler Benz. Second, we include rms that received forced labor workers from the
Nazi government. This measure is based on the “Catalogue of Camps and Prisons in Germany and
German-occupied Territories 1939-1945.” Examples of such rms are I.G. Farben and the oil and
gas company Deutsche Öl. Third, we exclude rms that the German public or the Nazi government
perceived as “Jewish” (see below for the denition of “Jewish” rms) from this sample. Overall,
this sample includes 171 rms that were favored by the Nazis.
Despite the fact that this sample of rms is much smaller than the full sample, the eect of losing
Jewish managers remains signicant at the 5 percent level in the specication with all controls. The
point estimate is somewhat larger than in the full sample (Table 6). Hence, losing Jewish managers
aected stock prices in a similar way even in a sample of rms that were not negatively exposed
to government repression in Nazi Germany.
Discrimination Against Firms Perceived as “Jewish”
In a second test, we analyze rms that were associated with Judaism more generally. Such rms
may have suered after the Nazis came to power, for example because of antisemitic measures by
the government or because they suered from consumer boycotts against Jewish rms. To test this
possibility, we identify a group of rms that contemporaries explicitly named as “Jewish rms.” We
systematically record all rms that are mentioned as being connected to Jews or Judaism in a range
of historical sources about Jews in Germany (Bruer 1927; Landsberg 1927a,b; Priester 1927; Mosse
1987).37 The majority of these “Jewish rms” had a Jewish founder, for example the department
store Leonhard Tietz, which was founded by the Jewish merchant of the same name, or Allgemeine
37As the historical sources only cover certain industries, we augment the denition of “Jewish rms” with the
denition of “Jewish rms” in Mosse (1987), the standard reference on Jews in the German economy. All results hold
if we focus on the denition that relies only on the contemporary sources.
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Electricitätsgesellschaft, one of the largest electrical companies in the world, which was founded by
the Jewish industrialist Emil Rathenau.38
We separately analyze the evolution of the stock prices of Jewish rms (Table 7). We nd
negative but insignicant coecients for the stock prices of Jewish rms after 1933 (columns 1-2).
The pattern becomes clearer when we separately consider the period after 1935. The stock prices
of Jewish rms hardly changed in 1933 and 1934, but declined signicantly by 12.7 log points
after 1935 (columns 3-4). These ndings are consistent with historical accounts: During the early
years of Nazi rule, large Jewish rms were not harmed by policies of the government because the
Nazi government wanted to boost employment and did not target any rms that were vital for the
economic recovery (James 2001, p. 38). After passing the Nuremberg racial laws in 1935, however,
the Nazi government explicitly began to target large rms perceived to be Jewish (Barkai 1990, p.
83; Strauss 1999, p. XVII; James 2001, p. 38).
Importantly, controlling for Jewish rms does not aect the post-1933 coecient on the fraction
of Jewish managers in 1932 (Table 7, columns 5-6). These results indicate that Jewish rms indeed
suered in Nazi Germany, but that the eect on Jewish rms was orthogonal to the eect of losing
Jewish managers.
To further explore the development of Jewish rms over time, we run a specication akin to
equation 3 and additionally include an indicator for Jewish rms, interacted with a full set of time
xed eects. Appendix Figure A.3 plots the point estimates on the indicator for Jewish rms over
time. Stock prices of Jewish rms remained constant until January 1935, and then started to de-
cline. They reached their lowest point in 1939. By 1943, they had fully recovered. The recovery
of stock prices of Jewish rms suggests that discriminatory measures against these rms had only
temporary eects, which lasted until they were taken over by non-Jews and were not any more
associated with Judaism. In contrast, the stock prices of rms that lost Jewish managers remained
persistently low, even after all Jewish managers had left their rms by 1938.
Taken together, these ndings imply that the eect of losing Jewish managers cannot be ex-
plained by other shocks that hit “Jewish rms.” This is hardly surprising. Many rms that had
employed managers of Jewish origin were not perceived to be “Jewish” in any way by the Nazis or
the public, and hence unlikely to face direct repression or shocks to demand. These rms included,
for example, BMW, Deutsche Reichsbahn, or I.G. Farben. They happened to employ managers of
Jewish origin and as a result suered from losing their Jewish managers but not from other dis-
criminatory measures.
38The average fraction of managers with Jewish origin was slightly higher in “Jewish rms” compared to other
rms (22 versus 13 percent), but there was signicant variation in both groups. The 1st to 99th percentile range of the
percentage of Jewish managers was from 0 to 50 percent for “Jewish rms” , and from 0 to 58 percent for other rms.
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Discrimination Against Lower-Ranked Jewish Employees
In a third test, we explore whether the stock prices of rms with Jewish managers declined be-
cause the loss of Jewish managers was correlated with discrimination against lower-ranked Jewish
employees. There are no consistent data on the number of lower-ranked Jewish employees for
rms that were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange. We therefore collect data on the share of
Jews among lower-ranked employees from historical statistics published by the German Statistical
Agency (Statistisches Reichsamt, see Appendix B.3 for details). These data are based on the 1933
census and report the fraction of Jews by sector (manufacturing or services) and region or large city
(for example, Berlin, Hamburg, Breslau, Königsberg). Whenever we are able to use the city-level
information, we do so (for about 33 percent of the sample). Otherwise, we use regional information.
The data allow us to estimate the eect of losing Jewish managers for rms in region-sector
cells with very low fractions of lower ranked Jewish employees (Table A.12). We rst focus on
rms in region-sector cells with the lowest quartile of Jewish blue collar workers (columns 1-2).
Next, we focus on rms in region-sector cells with the lowest quartile of lower-ranked Jewish white
collar workers (columns 3-4).39 In both samples, the post-1933 coecient on the share of Jewish
managers in 1932 is larger in absolute magnitude than in the baseline. Despite the small sample
sizes, the coecients remain signicant at the 5 or 10 percent levels.
Finally, we estimate the eect for rms in region-sector cells with the lowest quartiles of both
measures of lower ranked Jewish employees. In this sample, the percentage of Jews is only 0.22
percent among blue collar workers and 0.02 percent among lower ranked white collar workers
(Appendix Figure A.4). In contrast, the share of Jewish managers is still 10.7 percent in this sample
(compared to 13.8 percent in the full sample). In this sample, the post-1933 coecient on the share
of Jewish managers in 1932 is larger in absolute magnitude than in the baseline and signicant at
the 5 percent level. Overall, these results suggest that the underperformance of rms that lost Jew-
ish managers was not predominantly driven by a reduction in the supply of lower-ranked Jewish
employees.
Discrimination Against Jewish Shareholders
In a fourth test, we explore whether the stock prices of rms with Jewish managers declined be-
cause the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 was correlated with the presence of Jewish sharehold-
ers in 1932. There is no complete register of shareholders for this time period, but the Handbuch
der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932 lists large shareholders for the rms in our sample. For ex-
ample, the industrial property developer Königstadt AG lists two large shareholders: Bank für Brau
39Lower-ranked white collar workers do not contain the senior managers that are the focus of our analysis because
high-level white color workers are separately listed in the census data.
27
and the Jewish private bank Gebrüder Arnhold. We identify all Jewish individuals or rms (such as
Jewish private banks) that were large shareholders in any of the sample rms.40
We drop all rms that had a large Jewish shareholder in 1932 from the sample. The coecient
on the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932 is slightly larger but of similar magnitude than in the
full sample, and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level (Appendix Table A.13). This implies
that “re sales” of large blocks of stocks by Jewish shareholders do not aect the estimated eect
of losing Jewish managers. This nding is consistent with the historical literature, which suggests
that Jewish private banks and other Jewish shareholders were not able to sell their stocks, but that
their stock portfolios were mostly seized and redistributed as a whole.41
Discrimination by Retail Customers
In a fth test, we consider potential discrimination by retail customers that may have been corre-
lated with the share of Jewish managers. We focus on antisemitic customer boycotts that dispropor-
tionately hit retail rms by estimating results for non-retailers only. In this restricted sample, the
results are similar to the baseline results (Table 8, columns 9-10). This suggests that customer dis-
crimination cannot explain why rms with Jewish managers experienced declines in stock prices.
4.3.2 Correlated Demand Shocks (Not Directly Related to Discrimination)
Next, we explore whether other demand shocks, that were not directly caused by discrimination
against Jews, may have disproportionately aected rms with a larger share of Jewish managers
in 1932. Such demand shocks may have been caused by increased government spending in re-
armament and infrastructure, or because international customers retaliated against rms that dis-
missed their Jewish managers.
Rearmament Spending
Soon after gaining power, the Nazi government started a massive rearmament program. Armament
spending increased from about 0.8 billion RM in 1932 to 30 billion in 1939 (Carroll 1968). To analyze
demand shocks caused by armament spending, we estimate results for samples of rms that were
unlikely to be aected by such shocks. First, we exclude all rms that the Reichswehr had identied
40We classify rms as having a large Jewish shareholder if an individual shareholder was of Jewish origin (as dened
in Section 2.1), if an institutional shareholder was perceived as a “Jewish rm” (as dened in Section 4.3.1), or if the
institutional shareholder was Jewish private bank (as listed in Köhler 2008).
41We test the historical accounts further in unreported specications. We use the full sample of rms and include
an additional treatment variable: an indicator for having a large Jewish shareholder interacted with a post-1933 indi-
cator. The coecient on this additional variable is small and insignicant in specications with or without additional
regressors. For instance, the coecient is 0.027 (0.058), conditional on all the controls and on the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932 interacted with a post-1933 indicator. This shows that having a large Jewish shareholder did not
aect stock prices after 1933, conrming the historical narrative.
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as important for rearmament.42 The results remain almost unchanged in this sample (Table 8,
columns 3-4).
Second, we exclude all rms in industries that were relevant for rearmament and hence most
rms that may have been aected directly or indirectly by increased armament spending. In par-
ticular, we exclude all rms in iron and steel production, machine tools, and chemicals. Despite
dropping about half of all rms in our baseline sample, the coecient remains similar to the base-
line eect (Table 8, columns 5-6).
Infrastructure Investments
The new government also invested heavily in infrastructure works of various kinds, especially in-
frastructure that would be useful during a war: strategic roads (the famous Autobahn), airelds,
barracks, and waterways (Tooze 2008, p. 45). We therefore estimate results in a sample of rms
that were unlikely to benet from large infrastructure investments by excluding all rms in con-
struction. The results are similar to the baseline results (Table 8, columns 7-8).
Reduced Demand by International Customers
Finally, we consider whether lower demand by non-government actors from abroad may have dis-
proportionately hit rms with a larger share of Jewish managers. In particular, we analyze whether
rms with international activities may have suered dierential shocks after 1933. International
customers may have reacted to the rise of the Nazis or to the removal of Jewish managers by reduc-
ing demand for the products of rms that had employed Jewish managers. Alternatively, interna-
tional trading partners may have been less willing to work with German rms that had dismissed
their Jewish managers. The Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932 includes a written
narrative about each rm. We code international rms as those rms that reported “imports,” “ex-
ports,” or “foreign activity” as part of their business activities. For example, the large brewery Dort-
munder Actien-Brauerei reported “beer export: to Holland, France, Belgium, and overseas” among
its business activities. We estimate the eect of losing Jewish managers in the sample of rms
without international business activities. In this sample, the results remain similar to the baseline
results (Table 8, columns 9-10). This suggests that shocks to rms with international operations
cannot explain the eect of losing Jewish managers.
42We identify rms that may have beneted from increased armament spending based on a list of rms that the
Reichswehr had identied as important for rearmament production, as summarized in two lists published in Hansen
(1978). Anlage Nr. 6, pp. 217 reports rms that prepared for the production of armament material in 1927/28. Anlage
Nr. 10, pp. 226 reports rms that were important providers of inputs for armaments production in 1931. We exclude
all rms that were named in any of the two lists.
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5 The Eect on the Aggregate Market Valuation of Listed
Firms
A back-of-the-envelope calculation allows us to estimate the aggregate decrease in market val-
uation of rms listed in Berlin due to the loss of Jewish managers. The calculation relies on the
assumption that rms without Jewish managers were not aected by the removal of Jewish man-
agers from other rms. In other words, the assumption is that there were no spillover eects
from aected rms to rms without Jewish managers. Positive spillovers may exist because rms
without Jewish managers could have taken over market share from rms in their industry that
lost Jewish managers. Negative spillovers may exist in the form of reduced productivity spillovers
among rms in the same industry, lower regional aggregate demand, or because rms that had
employed Jewish managers poached managers from unaected rms.
We explore the plausibility of the assumption of no spillovers by testing for spillovers within
industries and within regions. We estimate regressions based on versions of equation 4 and report
the results in Appendix Table A.14. The regressors of interest include the original regressor (the
rm’s fraction of Jewish managers) and the average fraction of Jewish managers in all other rms in
the industry or the region, all interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. While
the coecients on the rm’s fraction of Jewish managers are stable and statistically signicant, the
coecients on the industry- and region-level fractions of Jewish managers are all insignicant and
negative. There is no evidence that positive spillovers played an important role. If anything, the
negative coecients suggest that spillovers amplied the negative rm-level eects of removing
the Jewish managers. Papers by Moretti (2010), Greenstone et al. (2010), Bloom et al. (2013b), and
Huber (2018) similarly suggest that spillover eects tend to amplify the eects of rm-level shocks.
Negative spillovers would imply that the following calculation underestimates the aggregate loss
to the German economy.
The aggregate market capitalization of rms in the sample was approximately 20.1 billion Re-
ichsmark, based on data of the market capitalization of rms from January 1933 or the closest
available month before January 1933. The average fraction of Jewish managers for all rms in
the sample was 0.14 in 1932 (Table 2). The point estimate for the eect of the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932 on the average log stock prices after 1933 is -0.46 (Table 4, column 6). This im-
plies a decrease of 36.87 percent (= 100 · [e−0.46 − 1]) if the rm lost all its managers. Multiplying
the percentage decrease with the average fraction of Jewish managers results in a 5.16 percent
(= −36.87 · 0.14) decline in the stock price of the average rm. Multiplying this average decline
with the total market capitalization in January 1933 gives an approximate loss of market valuation
of 1.04 billion (= 0.0516 · 20.1) Reichsmark due to the stock price decrease. German gross national
product in 1933 was 58.4 billion Reichsmark (Räth 2009), so the stock price drop due to the removal
of the Jewish managers reduced the market valuation of rms by 1.78 percent of the gross national
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product. This number is likely an underestimate of the aggregate loss to the German economy due
to aggregate antisemitic discrimination, since the expulsion of Jews aected the economy through
more channels than just the loss of managers in rms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
6 The Eect of Losing Jewish Managers on Dividends and
Returns on Assets
6.1 Dividends
In the previous sections, we presented evidence that the loss of Jewish managers changed the char-
acteristics of rms’ senior management and reduced rms’ stock prices. We now turn to assessing
the eect on additional measures of rm performance. The rst measure is the dividend paid to
investors. Together with stock price changes, the dividend determines the return of a stock to in-
vestors. The dividend also conveys information about the protability of a rm, since it is usually
paid out of rm prots. We use annual data on the dividend payments of all 655 rms in our sample
for the years 1929 to 1943 (see Section 2.3 for details). The dividend is reported as a percentage of
the nominal stock value. We estimate specications equivalent to equation 4, using dividends as
the dependent variable. As the dividend information is reported at yearly intervals, we replace the
time xed eects with year xed eects.
Firms that lost a higher fraction of Jewish managers lowered dividend payments after 1933,
but the eect is imprecisely estimated in the specication without controls (Table 9, column 1).
Adding the controls renders the eect signicantly dierent from zero at the 5 percent level. The
point estimate indicates that the average rm with Jewish managers (which lost 22 percent of its
managers) paid a dividend that was on average 0.34 percentage points lower from 1933 onward
(Table 9, column 2). The average dividend paid by all rms in the sample was 4.6 percent, so the
average rm with Jewish managers reduced its dividends by around 7.5 percent after 1933.
The specications using the binary treatment indicator estimate a slightly larger decrease in the
dividend for the average rm with Jewish managers (Table 9, columns 3-4). The point estimate in
column 4, conditional on all controls, implies a decrease in the average dividend after 1933 of 0.46
percentage points, a 10 percent drop relative to the average dividend paid by rms in the sample.
The eect on the stock price of the average rm with Jewish managers was 10.2 log points (Table
4, column 6), so the decrease in dividends was of similar proportional magnitude to the drop in
stock prices. This suggests that investors priced the stocks proportionately to the dividends.
6.2 Returns on Assets
We also examine how the loss of Jewish managers aected rms’ returns on assets, which is the
ratio of prots before interest payments and taxes to total assets. The return on assets is a com-
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monly used measure of the performance of rm managers, because it captures how eciently the
rm uses its available assets to generate prots (see Section 2.4 for details on the data). We estimate
specications equivalent to equation 4, but use the return on assets measured in 1931, 1936, and
1940 as the dependent variable.
In the specication with rm and year xed eects, the coecient on the fraction of Jewish
managers interacted with a post-1933 indicator is negative and signicant at the 5 percent level
(Table 9, column 5). In the specication with all controls, the coecient is also signicant at the 5
percent level. The point estimate implies that the return on assets of the average rm with Jewish
managers was 4.1 percentage points lower after 1933 (Table 9, column 6). The specication with
the binary treatment indicator estimates a similar decrease of 5.3 percentage points for the average
rm with Jewish managers, which is signicant at the 10 percent level (Table 9, column 8).
Overall, the evidence in this section indicates that the eect of losing Jewish managers went
beyond stock prices. The reductions in dividends and returns on assets show that the rms were
less protable and less ecient after losing the Jewish managers.
7 Conclusion
We study the economic eects of discrimination against Jewish managers in German rms.
Our analysis relies on newly digitized data, based on a large number of historical sources. We
collect information on the characteristics of senior managers at all rms listed on the Berlin Stock
Exchange, as well as stock prices, dividend payments, and returns on assets of these rms.
The removal of the Jewish managers, caused by rising antisemitism after the Nazis came to
power in 1933, negatively aected German rms, including some of the largest and most important
corporations. The observable characteristics of senior managers changed in long-lasting ways in
rms that had employed Jewish managers. For example, the number of managers with rm-specic
tenure, general experience, and a university education, as well as the total number of managerial
connections to other rms fell. After 1933, the stock prices of aected rms dropped sharply and
remained low until the end of our sample period in 1943. The dividend payments and the returns
on assets of aected rms also decreased, indicating that rms were less protable and ecient
because they were unable to replace the Jewish managers adequately. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation implies that removing the Jewish managers caused large reductions in the aggregate
market valuation of listed rms.
The ndings of this paper inform our understanding of how discrimination can cause real eco-
nomic harm, by leading to the removal of highly qualied business leaders. We study arguably the
most severe form of discrimination against a particular group of individuals, but even less severe
forms of discrimination can lead to a loss of talent. As highlighted above, the travel ban on citizens
of seven Muslim-majority countries in the United States or the persecution of Turkish business-
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men who follow the cleric Fethullah Gulen are current examples of rising discrimination that are
likely to aect rms. Even the perception of not being welcome in a country may lead to outow of
highly qualied individuals with similar consequences. A recent survey in the wake of the Brexit
referendum suggests, for example, that 12 percent of continental Europeans who make between
£100,001 ($130,000) and £200,000 a year were planning to leave the United Kingdom in the coming
years (The Economist 2017a). The results in our paper indicate that such an exodus would have
large economic consequences.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Jewish Managers over Time
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Notes: The gure reports the percentage of senior management positions that were held by Jewish managers in the 655 rms
that were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
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Figure 2: The Effect of Losing Jewish Managers on Manager Characteristics
(a) Tenure as Manager since 1928
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(b) Experience as Manager since 1928
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(e) Connections - Same Industry
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(f) Connections - Other Industries
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Notes: The gure reports yearly coecients (βτ ) and 95 percent condence intervals from equation 1. Each panel reports
results for dierent dependent variables, which are indicated in the heading of the panel. The dependent variables are in
natural logarithms. The main explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a xed eect
for each year. The interaction with 1932, the last year before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. Coecients
and standard errors are scaled to reect the eect on the average rm with Jewish managers in 1932. The average such rm
lost 22 percent of its managers after 1932. All regressions include rm and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered
at the rm level.
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Figure 3: The Effect of Losing Jewish Managers on Stock Prices
(a) With Firm and Year Fixed Eects
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(b) With All Controls
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Notes: The gure reports coecients (βτ ) and 95 percent condence intervals from equation 3. The dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and
July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a xed
eect for each time period. The interaction with January 1933, the last period before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded
interaction. Coecients and standard errors are scaled to reect the eect on the average rm with Jewish managers in 1932.
The average such rm lost 22 percent of its managers after 1932. Panel (a) controls for rm and time xed eects. Panel
(b) additionally controls for an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published
its 1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All these
additional controls are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Managers in 1932
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Jewish Managers
All Jewish Non-Jewish in Firms with
Managers Managers Managers Jewish Managers
Number of senior management positions 7,791 1,230 6,561 4,426
Number of senior managers 4,873 423 4,450 2,902
Manager characteristics (manager level):
% managers with university degree 36.18 45.15 35.33 37.35
% managers with Kommerzienrat title 4.72 8.75 4.34 4.62
% managers with tenure since 1928 62.59 70.92 61.80 61.06
% managers with experience since 1928 69.61 82.98 68.34 68.47
Avg. number of supervisory board positions 1.26 2.90 1.11 1.16
Notes: The data on managers are for the year 1932 and were collected from various historical sources (see Section 2 for
details).
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Firms in 1932
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Jewish At Least One Jewish
All Firms Managers Manager
All Fraction Jewish Managers Fraction Jewish Managers
≤ Median > Median ≤ Median > Median
Without Conglomerates
Number of rms 655 247 408 215 193 213 193
Number of senior managers 11.89 8.64 13.86 13.56 14.20 13.24 14.20
Number of Jewish senior managers 1.88 0.00 3.01 1.61 4.58 1.58 4.58
Fraction of Jewish senior managers 0.14 0.00 0.22 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
Number of managers with tenure since 1928 7.54 5.43 8.82 8.40 9.29 8.14 9.29
Number of managers with experience since 1928 9.21 6.37 10.92 10.41 11.50 10.14 11.50
Number of managers with degree 4.94 3.11 6.06 5.71 6.44 5.47 6.44
Number of connections 37.57 16.98 50.04 40.71 60.43 40.27 60.43
Number of connections to the same industry 15.97 9.50 19.89 17.96 22.04 17.78 22.04
Number of connections to other industries 21.60 7.48 30.15 22.75 38.39 22.49 38.39
Nazi connection 0.17 0.09 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20
Nominal capital (in million RM) 36.30 4.71 55.43 91.69 15.03 17.47 15.03
Firm age (in years) 42.06 42.89 41.55 40.95 42.23 41.25 42.23
Balance sheet reported in January 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.68
Notes: The data on managers, their characteristics, and control variables are for the year 1932 and were collected from
various historical sources (see Section 2 for details).
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Table 3: The Effect on the Characteristics of Firms’ Senior Management
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Tenure since 1928), # of obs./rms: 2407/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.840*** -0.835*** -0.831*** -0.830*** -0.830*** -0.813***
× Post 1933 (0.110) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113)
R2 0.747 0.747 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.757
Panel B: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Experience since 1928), # of obs./rms: 2487/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.586*** -0.601*** -0.599*** -0.598*** -0.594*** -0.597***
× Post 1933 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107)
R2 0.660 0.663 0.663 0.665 0.665 0.681
Panel C: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Degree), # of obs./rms: 2400/645
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.272** -0.257** -0.257** -0.256** -0.255** -0.218**
× Post 1933 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109)
R2 0.016 0.022 0.022 0.029 0.029 0.053
Panel D: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections), # of obs./rms: 2530/655
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.812*** -0.808*** -0.813*** -0.811*** -0.812*** -0.746***
× Post 1933 (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.141)
R2 0.220 0.222 0.230 0.232 0.233 0.253
Panel E: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in the Same Ind.)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.474*** -0.471*** -0.478*** -0.476*** -0.475*** -0.386***
× Post 1933 (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098)
R2 0.166 0.169 0.174 0.181 0.182 0.228
Panel F: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in Dierent Ind.)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -1.091*** -1.086*** -1.089*** -1.084*** -1.084*** -1.046***
× Post 1933 (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.195)
R2 0.178 0.179 0.185 0.187 0.188 0.212
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Notes: The Table reports point estimates (β1) from equation 2 for dierent dependent variables, which are indicated in the
heading of each panel. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with
an indicator for the years after 1932. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an
indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in
1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted with a full set of year xed eects. The data include the years
1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗
p<0.1.
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Table 4: The Effect on Stock Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.469*** -0.459*** -0.458*** -0.479*** -0.479*** -0.464***
× Post 1933 (0.138) (0.136) (0.136) (0.134) (0.134) (0.138)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.566 0.569 0.570 0.580 0.582 0.622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator
for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January,
rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time
xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at
the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 5: The Effect of Losing Managers with Certain Characteristics on Stock
Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 < Lost Characteristics at Firm with Jewish Manager (1932) < 0.20 -0.114* -0.082 -0.052 -0.037 -0.111** -0.093* 0.000 0.058
× Post 1933 (0.064) (0.061) (0.047) (0.046) (0.055) (0.050) (0.069) (0.065)
0.20 ≤ Connections Lost < 0.80 -0.144*** -0.133*** -0.019 -0.013
× Post 1933 (0.046) (0.045) (0.060) (0.057)
0.80 ≤ Connections Lost -0.366*** -0.359*** -0.203* -0.191*
× Post 1933 (0.109) (0.098) (0.119) (0.107)
0.20 ≤ Degrees Lost < 0.80 -0.214*** -0.199*** -0.180*** -0.167***
× Post 1933 (0.053) (0.051) (0.067) (0.064)
0.80 ≤ Degrees Lost -0.623*** -0.733*** -0.554*** -0.668***
× Post 1933 (0.208) (0.209) (0.210) (0.214)
0.20 ≤ Experienced Managers Lost < 0.80 -0.170*** -0.163*** 0.019 0.016
× Post 1933 (0.048) (0.047) (0.077) (0.065)
0.80 ≤ Experienced Managers Lost -0.385*** -0.110 -0.179 0.081
× Post 1933 (0.077) (0.170) (0.118) (0.198)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.567 0.623 0.572 0.629 0.566 0.622 0.573 0.630
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variables in columns 1 to 6 are indicators
for whether losing Jewish managers reduced the value of the given managerial characteristic by: 1) less than 20 percent, 2)
20 percent to less than 80 percent, and 3) more than 80 percent. In columns 7 and 8, the rst explanatory variable indicates
rms where the loss of Jewish managers reduced the value of all three managerial characteristic by less than 20 percent.
(Including multiple heterogeneity categories in one regression, as we do in columns 7 and 8, requires dening one baseline
category for losing less than 20 percent in all categories, in order to avoid a problem of perfect multicollinearity.) For rms
without Jewish managers in 1932, all of the reported indicator variables in all columns are zero. The main explanatory
variables are all interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables are identical to Table
4. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm
level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 6: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Favored by the Nazis
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.576* -0.704**
× Post 1933 (0.333) (0.313)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
All Controls Yes
Number of Observations 3834 3834
Number of Firms 171 171
R2 0.563 0.663
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The sample of favored rms contains rms
with connections to the Nazi Party and rms that received forced labor workers from the Nazi government. We exclude
rms historically perceived as Jewish. The control variables are identical to Table 4. The data include the months January
and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗
p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table 7: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Perceived As Jewish
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Jewish Firm -0.127 -0.137 -0.021 -0.041 0.029 0.007
× Post 1933 (0.096) (0.084) (0.097) (0.090) (0.099) (0.092)
Jewish Firm -0.140** -0.127** -0.142** -0.131**
× Post 1935 (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.446*** -0.441***
× Post 1933 (0.138) (0.138)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.563 0.619 0.563 0.620 0.567 0.623
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-
day window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The rst main explanatory variable is an indicator for rms
historically perceived as Jewish, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The second main explanatory
variable is an indicator for rms historically perceived as Jewish, interacted with an indicator for the months after January
1935. The third main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator
for the months after January 1933. The control variables are identical to Table 4. The data include the months January and
July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05,
and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table 8: Correlated Demand Shocks
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No Iron and Steel, Non-International
No Retail No Arms Producers Machines, Chemicals No Construction Firms
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.463*** -0.464*** -0.457*** -0.449*** -0.588*** -0.425** -0.460*** -0.461*** -0.479*** -0.376**
(0.140) (0.140) (0.138) (0.138) (0.170) (0.187) (0.145) (0.144) (0.162) (0.165)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 12546 12546 12070 12070 7588 7588 12004 12004 7657 7657
Number of Firms 647 647 626 626 386 386 620 620 419 419
R2 0.563 0.621 0.561 0.619 0.532 0.605 0.558 0.616 0.564 0.624
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We drop from the sample: rms in
the retail sector (columns 1 and 2); rms that the Reichswehr had listed as important for armaments production, based
on Hansen (1978) (columns 3 and 4); rms producing iron and steel, machines, and chemicals (columns 5 and 6); rms in
the construction sector (columns 7 and 8); rms that were internationally active (columns 9 and 10). The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial
statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table 9: The Effect on Dividends and Returns on Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable: Dividends Return on Assets
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -1.266 -1.557** -0.235** -0.187**
× Post 1933 (0.960) (0.778) (0.105) (0.079)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.528 -0.459* -0.060* -0.053*
× Post 1933 (0.326) (0.252) (0.033) (0.029)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 7379 7379 7379 7379 492 492 492 492
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 289 289 289 289
R2 0.176 0.240 0.177 0.240 0.401 0.560 0.398 0.559
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 is the annual dividend payment, measured as a percentage of the nominal
stock value. The data in columns 1 to 4 include the years 1929 to 1943. The dependent variable in columns 5 to 8 is the
return on assets, measured as the ratio of prots before interest payments and taxes to total assets. The data in columns 5
to 8 include the years 1931, 1936, and 1940. The rst main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in
1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The second main explanatory variable is an indicator
for whether the rm had any Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The
control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its
1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls
are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Figure A.1: The Effect of Losing Jewish Managers on Manager Characteristics
(With All Controls)
(a) Tenure as Manager since 1928
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(b) Experience as Manager since 1928
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f L
os
in
g 
22
%
 o
f M
an
ag
er
s
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
(c) Managers with Degree
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(d) Connections
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f L
os
in
g 
22
%
 o
f M
an
ag
er
s
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
(e) Connections - Same Industry
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(f) Connections - Other Industries
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Notes: The gure reports yearly coecients (βτ ) and 95 percent condence intervals from equation 1. Each panel reports
results for dierent dependent variables, which are indicated in the heading of the panel. The dependent variables are in
natural logarithms. The main explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a xed eect
for each year. The interaction with 1932, the last year before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. Coecients
and standard errors are scaled to reect the eect on the average rm with Jewish managers in 1932. The average such rm
lost 22 percent of its managers after 1932. All regressions include rm and year xed and the following control variables: an
indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in
January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted with a full set
of year xed eects. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
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Figure A.2: The Effect on Stock Prices, Adjusted for Dividend Payments
(a) With Firm and Year Fixed Eects
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(b) With All Controls
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Notes: This gure is identical to Figure 3, except that the stock prices in the dependent variable are adjusted for dividend
payments. We adjust for dividend payments by assuming that investors immediately reinvest the dividend paid out by a
rm into the stock of that rm (see Appendix B.2.3 for details). This adjustment means that the coecients measure the
eect of losing Jewish managers on the return of investing (on January 10, 1933) into the average rm with Jewish managers
in 1932, relative to investing into a rm without Jewish managers in 1932.
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Figure A.3: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Perceived as Jewish
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Notes: The gure reports coecients (βτ ) and 95 percent condence intervals from a regression similar to equation 3. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window
around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the rm was
perceived as Jewish by contempories, interacted with a xed eect for each time period. The interaction with January 1933,
the last period before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. The regression also controls for the fraction of
Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a full set of time xed eects, and all controls used in Figure 3, panel (b). Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level.
Figure A.4: The Share of Jews in Region-Sector Cells With Few Lower-Ranked
Jewish Employees
0.22 0.02
10.79
Blue Collar Lower Ranked
White Collar
Managers
Notes: The gure reports the average percentage of blue collar workers (left bar), lower ranked white color workers (middle
bar) and managers (right bar) in the sample of rms with in region-sector cells with the lowest quartiles of both blue collar
workers and lower-ranked white collar employees. This sample is equivalent to the estimatation sample for columns 5 and
6 in Table A.12. The data on lower ranked employees come from the 1933 census (see Section B.3 for details). The data on
managers come from Handbuch der Deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932.
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Figure A.5: The Effect on Dividends
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Notes: The gure reports coecients (βτ ) and 95 percent condence intervals from a regression similar to equation 3.
The dependent variable is the annual dividend payment, measured as a percentage of the nominal stock value. The main
explanatory variables are the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with a xed eect for each year. The interaction
with 1932, the last year before the Nazis gained power, is the excluded interaction. The control variables include: rm xed
eects, time xed eects, an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its
1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls
are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
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Table A.1: The Effect on the Characteristics of Firms’ Senior Management, us-
ing the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# of Managers # of Managers # of Connections # of Connections
with Tenure with Experience # of Managers to Firms in the to Firms in
Dep. Variable: since 1928 since 1928 with Degree # of Connections Same Industry Dierent Industries
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.958*** -0.662*** -0.215** -0.756*** -0.423*** -1.015***
× Post 1933 (0.115) (0.096) (0.093) (0.122) (0.082) (0.183)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.713 0.635 0.011 0.225 0.167 0.164
Notes: The heading of each column lists the relevant dependent variable. All dependent variables are transformed using
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, an approximation to the log transformation that permits using zero values. The
main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the years after
1932. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance
levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.2: The Effect on the Characteristics of Firms’ Senior Management (Bi-
nary Treatment Indicator)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Tenure since 1928), # of obs./rms: 2407/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.226*** -0.215***
× Post 1933 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
R2 0.746 0.746 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.755
Panel B: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Experience since 1928), # of obs./rms: 2487/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.149*** -0.163*** -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.150***
× Post 1933 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
R2 0.657 0.661 0.662 0.663 0.664 0.678
Panel C: Dep. Variable: log(# of Managers with Degree), # of obs./rms: 2400/645
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.144*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.123***
× Post 1933 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
R2 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.035 0.035 0.058
Panel D: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections), # of obs./rms: 2530/655
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.233*** -0.232*** -0.233*** -0.231*** -0.234*** -0.218***
× Post 1933 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
R2 0.217 0.218 0.226 0.229 0.230 0.251
Panel E: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in the Same Ind.)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.138***
× Post 1933 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
R2 0.169 0.172 0.177 0.183 0.184 0.231
Panel F: Dep. Variable: log(# of Connections to Firms in Dierent Ind.)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.276*** -0.274*** -0.274*** -0.271*** -0.275*** -0.257***
× Post 1933 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
R2 0.171 0.171 0.178 0.179 0.181 0.205
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Notes: The heading of each panel lists the relevant dependent variable. The main explanatory variable is an indicator for
whether the rm had any Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the years after 1932. The control variables
are identical to Table 3. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.3: The Effect on the Total Number of Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: # of Managers log(# of Managers)
Jewish Managers (1932) 0.074 0.007
× Post 1933 (0.100) (0.004)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) 0.359 -0.080
× Post 1933 (0.939) (0.056)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) 0.089 -0.026*
× Post 1933 (0.216) (0.015)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530 2530
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.359 0.358 0.358
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is the number of managers. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the
natural logarithm of the number of managers. The rst explanatory variable measures the number of Jewish managers in
1932. The second explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. The third explanatory variable is
an indicator for whether the rm had any Jewish managers in 1932. The three explanatory variables are all interacted with
an indicator for the years after 1932. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an
indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in
1932, and industry xed eects. We also control for the log of the total number of managers in 1928 because there was a
secular decrease in the number of managers in rms that had large boards in 1928. All controls are interacted with a full set
of year xed eects. The data include the years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level.
Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.4: The Effect of Dismissals in 1933 and Dismissals After 1933 on Stock
Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2)
Firms with dismissals in 1933
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.408*** -0.343**
× 1(1933) (0.154) (0.157)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.534*** -0.490***
× Post 1934 (0.146) (0.149)
Firms with all dismissals after 1933
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.100 0.039
× 1(1933) (0.217) (0.209)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.307 -0.440**
× Post 1934 (0.235) (0.224)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
All Controls Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655
R2 0.567 0.622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variables measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for (a) July 1933, (b) January 1934 and all months after, (c) July 1933 in rms
with dismissals after 1933, and (d) January 1934 and all months after in rms with dismissals after 1933. The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial
statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.5: The Effect on Stock Prices (Binary Treatment Indicator)
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm with Jewish Managers (1932) -0.147*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.133***
× Post 1933 (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710 12710
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655 655 655
R2 0.566 0.568 0.570 0.579 0.581 0.621
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the rm
had any Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial
statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table A.6: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms With At Least One Jewish Man-
ager
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4)
At Least One Jewish Without
Manager Conglomerates
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.298 -0.370* -0.297 -0.394**
× Post 1933 (0.195) (0.188) (0.196) (0.187)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes
Number of Observations 8648 8648 8593 8593
Number of Firms 408 408 406 406
R2 0.565 0.626 0.566 0.630
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The sample contains all rms with at least one Jewish manager.
In addition, we drop conglomerates in columns 3 and 4. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator
for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January,
rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time
xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at
the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.7: The Effect on Stock Prices Controlling for Firm Size
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Without Firm Size
Full Sample Conglomerates ≤ Median > Median
Panel A: Measure of Firm Size: Nominal Capital
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.464*** -0.416*** -0.403*** -0.441*** -0.637** -0.468***
× Post 1933 (0.138) (0.136) (0.134) (0.134) (0.268) (0.159)
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12655 5170 7540
Number of Firms 655 655 655 653 335 320
R2 0.622 0.628 0.635 0.626 0.660 0.630
Panel B: Measure of Firm Size: Total Number of Managers
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.416*** -0.381*** -0.368*** -0.401*** -0.493** -0.433**
× Post 1933 (0.135) (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) (0.215) (0.169)
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12655 5950 6760
Number of Firms 655 655 655 653 345 310
R2 0.624 0.624 0.634 0.625 0.657 0.623
Panel C: Measure of Firm Size: Both Nominal Capital and Total Number of Managers
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.418*** -0.380*** -0.358*** -0.404***
× Post 1933 (0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.135)
Number of Observations 12710 12710 12710 12655
Number of Firms 655 655 655 653
R2 0.625 0.629 0.647 0.627
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Size Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log of Firm Size Yes
Deciles of Firm Size Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We use the full sample in columns 1 to
3. In column 4, we drop conglomerates. In column 5, the sample contains only rms below the median for the respective
rm size measure (panel A: nominal capital, panel B: total number of managers). In column 6, the sample contains only
rms above the median for the respective rm size measure. Column 1 and columns 4 to 7 control for the level of nominal
capital, column 2 for natural logarithm of nominal capital, and column 3 for deciles of nominal capital. All specications
control for: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial
statement in January, rm age in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls, including the controls for nominal capital,
are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to
1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.8: The Effect on Stock Prices Using Alternative Stock Price Measures
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exclude 1932 5-day Window 3-day Window Monthly Stock Prices
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.530*** -0.512*** -0.484*** -0.468*** -0.489*** -0.468*** -0.456*** -0.445***
× Post 1933 (0.148) (0.149) (0.141) (0.139) (0.144) (0.142) (0.137) (0.137)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 11841 11841 11781 11781 11330 11330 12762 12762
Number of Firms 655 655 653 653 653 653 654 654
R2 0.502 0.565 0.554 0.612 0.545 0.605 0.571 0.626
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window (columns 1 and 2), plus-minus ve-day window (columns 3 and 4), or plus-minus three-day window (columns 5
and 6) around January 10th and July 10th of each year. Stock prices in columns 7 and 8 are averaged over the entire month
of January and July of each year. We exclude the observations for 1932 in columns 1 and 2. The main explanatory variable
measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. The
control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its
1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls
are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to
1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
Table A.9: The Effect on Stock Prices of Regularly Traded Firms
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
≥ 15 stock prices ≥ 25 stock prices 30 stock prices
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.421*** -0.445*** -0.396** -0.421*** -0.700*** -0.725***
× Post 1933 (0.146) (0.145) (0.157) (0.154) (0.235) (0.233)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 10645 10645 8755 8755 3690 3690
Number of Firms 401 401 306 306 123 123
R2 0.574 0.639 0.597 0.667 0.570 0.677
Notes: We include rms that were traded on at least 15 Januarys or Julys between January 1929 and July 1943 in columns
1 and 2. We include rms that were traded on at least 25 Januarys or Julys in columns 3 and 4. We include rms that
were traded on all 30 Januarys or Julys in columns 5 and 6. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock
price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main
explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after
January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether
the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed
eects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the
years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗
p<0.1.
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Table A.10: The Effect on Firm Delisting
Dep. Variable: Delisting Indicator (1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear Probability Model Extended Cox Hazard Model
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.018 -0.038
(0.128) (0.130)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.415 -0.315
× Post 1933 (0.448) (0.457)
All Controls Yes Yes
Number of Firms 655 655 655 655
R2 0.000 0.051
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the results of a cross-sectional, linear probability model. The dependent variable in columns
1 and 2 is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the rm was delisted after January 1933. The main explanatory variable measures
the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party,
an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital
in 1932, and industry xed eects. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of an extended Cox hazard model, with time-varying
coecients. The data include two periods, before and after January 1933. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the
natural logarithm of the relative hazard of being delisted in the relevant period. The main explanatory variable measures
the fraction of Jewish managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the period after January 1933. The control variables
are as in columns 1 and 2, but all are interacted with xed eects for the periods before and after January 1933. Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.11: The Effect of Losing Managers in Important and Regular Positions
on Stock Prices
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frac. Jewish Managers in Important -0.253* -0.263* -0.262* -0.290** -0.288** -0.267**
Positions (1932) × Post 1933 (0.137) (0.135) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131) (0.128)
Frac. Jewish Managers in Regular -0.213 -0.197 -0.196 -0.197 -0.198 -0.207
Positions (1932) × Post 1933 (0.130) (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nazi Connection × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reporting Period × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Age × Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Nominal Capital × Time FE Yes Yes
Industry FE × Time FE Yes
Number of Observations 12698 12698 12698 12698 12698 12698
Number of Firms 654 654 654 654 654 654
R2 0.566 0.569 0.570 0.580 0.582 0.622
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The rst main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in important positions in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. Important positions
are dened as executive board positions or chair and vice chair of the supervisory board. The second main explanatory vari-
able measures the fraction of Jewish managers in regular supervisory board positions in 1932, interacted with an indicator
for the months after January 1933. The control variables include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an
indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in
1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months
January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.12: The Effect on Stock Prices in Region-Sector Cells With Few Lower-
Ranked Jewish Employees
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Below 25th Percentile of Jewish Employees Among:
Blue Collar Lower-Ranked White
Workers Collar Employees Both Categories
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.776** -0.689* -0.750** -0.758** -0.857** -0.860**
× Post 1933 (0.338) (0.370) (0.329) (0.365) (0.367) (0.416)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All Controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2824 2824 2888 2888 2342 2342
Number of Firms 165 165 165 165 136 136
R2 0.569 0.662 0.588 0.667 0.578 0.666
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. In columns 1 and 2, we only include rms
in regions-sector cells below the 25th percentile among blue collar workers. In columns 3 and 4, we only include rms in
regions-sector cells below the 25th percentile among lower-ranked white collar employees. In columns 5 and 6, we only
include rms in regions-sector cells below the 25th percentile among both blue collar workers and lower-ranked white collar
employees. The data for the lower-ranked employees are from the 1933 German census. The additional control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial
statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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Table A.13: The Effect on Stock Prices of Firms Without Large Jewish Share-
holders
Dep. Variable: log(Stock Price) (1) (2)
Frac. Jewish Managers (1932) -0.480*** -0.489***
× Post 1933 (0.156) (0.157)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
All Controls Yes
Number of Observations 11329 11329
Number of Firms 589 589
R2 0.560 0.621
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the stock price. Stock prices are averaged in a plus-minus 10-day
window around January 10th and July 10th of each year. The main explanatory variable measures the fraction of Jewish
managers in 1932, interacted with an indicator for the months after January 1933. We drop rms from the sample where
a Jewish individual or a Jewish rm (for example a Jewish private bank) was a large shareholders. The control variables
include: an indicator for any connections to the Nazi Party, an indicator for whether the rm published its 1932 nancial
statement in January, rm age in 1932, rm nominal capital in 1932, and industry xed eects. All controls are interacted
with a full set of time xed eects. The data include the months January and July for the years from 1929 to 1943. Standard
errors are clustered at the rm level. Signicance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, and ∗ p<0.1.
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B Online Data Appendix
B.1 Information on Managers
The data on senior managers of all rms listed on the Berlin Stock exchange in 1932 come from
four editions of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1928, 1932, 1933, and 1939), which
is a compilation of annual reports of all joint stock rms in Germany (see Figure B.1 for a sample
page). Until 1933, the Handbuch included amendments, so that the list of senior managers reects
the status at the end of the respective years (1928, 1932, and 1933). In 1939, the Handbuch did
not publish amendments so that the list of senior managers reects the status at the time of the
publication of the annual report. We therefore refer to the relevant years as 1928, 1932, 1933, and
1938.
Figure B.1: Example Page from Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1932
Notes: The gure displays the entry for Bayerische Motoren-Werke (BMW) from the 1932 edition of the Handbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften, pp 435-437.
B.1.1 Harmonizing Manager Names
We manually harmonize the spelling of thousands of manager names. This allows us to match
managers across rms in the same volume of the Handbuch and/or across dierent volumes of the
Handbuch. For example “Philipp Heineken” is sometimes abbreviated as “Phil. Heineken” or “Ph.
Heineken.” The harmonization also allows us to match managers to sources on Jewish managers.
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B.1.2 Measuring Manager Characteristics
Tenure and Experience
After harmonizing the spelling of manager names, we merge the list of all managers who were
present 1932 to the list of managers who were present in 1928. This allows us to measure tenure
and experience as senior managers since 1928.
University Degree
We classify managers as managers with a degree if the Handbuch lists them with the following
characteristics:
1. Professor title (Prof.)
2. PhD (Dr.)
3. Professions that require a university degree (for example Diplomingeneur, Rechtsanwalt,
Architekt, Chemiker)
4. Civil service positions that require a university degree (for example Justizrat, Ministerialdirek-
tor, Finanzrat)
Sometimes, the same manager reports a characteristic (for example a Dr. degree) in the annual
report of one rm but does not report the characteristic in the annual report of another rm. If
a characteristic is reported at least once for a manager in a certain volume of the Handbuch we
classify the manager as holding that characteristic (for example a university degree) for all rms
in that year.
Number of Supervisory Board Positions in Other Firms
For each of the four years 1928, 1932, 1933, and 1938 we count the number of supervisory board po-
sitions in other rms of our Berlin sample using the manager name (after harmonizing the spelling
of manager names) and additional information about the manager (for example whether he holds
a PhD degree or information on his place of residence).
B.1.3 Information on the Jewish Origin of Managers
As described in the main text, we consult multiple sources to identify Jewish managers.
1. Münzel (2006)
Münzel (2006) analyses Jewish board members in the 300 largest joint stock rms. We extract
all Jewish board members from his book.
2. Windolf (2011)
For the research published in Windolf (2011), Windolf compiles a list of Jewish board mem-
bers in German rms. We use Windolf’s list to identify additional Jewish board members.
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3. Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933
The Biographisches Handbuch contains short biographies of Jewish business people who em-
igrated from Nazi Germany. We extract all individuals who are listed under the business
heading.
4. Köhler (2008)
Studies private bankers of Jewish origin. We extract all Jewish private bankers from his book.
5. World Biographical Information System (WBIS)
The database combines biographical information from various collections of biographies, for
example Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA) and Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA).
We search the WBIS for all managers who did not appear in sources 1 to 4 to check whether
they were of Jewish origin. Jews are identied if they appear in the Jüdisches Biographisches
Archiv (JBA), Ekkehard (1929), Lowenthal (1981), Tetzla (1982), Walk (2014) or if they list
their religion as Jewish in any other source. The following example provides an overview of
the procedure.
Example World Biographical Information System (WBIS)
The 1932 edition of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften lists Alfred Zielenziger
as manager of Deutsche Hypothekenbank AG and Schultheiss-Patzenhofer Brauerei AG. Since
Zielenziger is not listed among the managers in sources 1 to 4 we follow a manual search
through World Biographical Information System (WBIS). We nd three entries in Deutsches
Biographisches Archiv (DBA) and two entries in Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA). Figure
B.2 reports the respective entries from the DBA. The entries from JBA are identical to entries
(b) and (c) from DBA and therefore not reported. We identify Alfred Zielenziger as Jewish
because he appears in Lowenthal (1981) and Walk (2014), which are biographical sources on
Jews in Germany.
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Figure B.2: Example of Alfred Zielenziger
(a) Wenzel (1929)
Name: Zielenziger, Alfred
Archive: Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA)
Fiche Location: II 1446,397;III 1021,353-354
Part: 2
Microfiche number: 1446
Frame number: 397
URL: https://wbis.degruyter.com/biographic-document/D636-720-1
(b) Lowenthal (1981)
Name: Zielenziger, Alfred
Archive: Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA)
Fiche Location: II 1446,397;III 1021,353-354
Part: 2
Microfiche number: 1446
Frame number: 353
URL: https://wbis.degruyter.com/biographic-document/D636-720-1
(c) Walk (2014)
Name: Zielenziger, Alfred
Archive: Jüdisches Biographisches Archiv (JBA)
Fiche Location: II 591,77-78
Part: 2
Microfiche number: 0591
Frame number: 078
URL: https://wbis.degruyter.com/biographic-document/J168-484-1
Notes: The gure displays the entries for Alfred Zielenziger from World Biographical Informa-
tion System (WBIS) based on Wenzel (1929), Lowenthal (1981), and Walk (2014).
6. Internet Search
Finally, we hand-check all managers who do not appear in sources 1 to 5 by conducting an
internet search to nd information on their religion. For example, for managers based in
Berlin, we look up Jüdisches Addressbuch für Großberlin, 1931 (available at: https://digital.
zlb.de/viewer/resolver?urn=urn:nbn:de:kobv:109-1-2414417) and verify whether they can be
matched by name and address with an entry in the address book. T e following example
provides an overview of the procedure.
Example Internet Search
The 1932 edition of theHandbuch der deutschenAktiengesellschaften lists Dr. Felix Warschauer
as manager of Hermann Meyer & Co. AG. Since Dr. Warschauer is not listed among the
managers in sources 1 to 4 we follow a manual search through WBIS. We nd one entry
in Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA). The entry in Wenzel (1929) lists Dr. Warschauer
with an address in Berlin (Berlin-Schöneberg, Bayerischer Platz 9, see Figure B.3), but does
not contain information on his religion. The Berlin address allows us to check for an entry
in the Jüdisches Addressbuch für Großberlin, 1931 which lists addresses of Jews in Berlin. We
nd Dr. Felix Warschauer with the same address in the Jüdisches Addressbuch für Großberlin,
1931 (see Figure B.3) and hence classify him as a Jew.
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Figure B.3: Example of Dr. Felix Warschauer
(a) Wenzel (1929)
Name: Warschauer, Felix
Archive: Deutsches Biographisches Archiv (DBA)
Fiche Location: II 1366,314
Part: 2
Microfiche number: 1366
Frame number: 314
URL: https://wbis.degruyter.com/biographic-document/D665-376-5
(b) Jüdisches Adressbuch für
Großberlin, 1931
Notes: The left subgure displays the entries for Dr. Felix Warschauer from World Biographical
Information System (WBIS) based on Wenzel (1929). The right subgure displays the entry for
Dr. Felix Warschauer from Jüdisches Adressbuch für Großberlin, 1931, p. 420.
B.2 Information on Firms
B.2.1 Stock Price Data
We manually digitize all stock prices for January and July of each year between 1929 and 1943
from historical listings (called Börse und Wirtschaft, later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse) of the
Berlin Stock Exchange. Figure B.4 provides an example of page 21 from the January 1933 edition.
Because of the German banking crisis in 1931/1932 the Berlin Stock Exchange was closed in January
1932. We therefore collect stock prices for April and October for 1932.
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Figure B.4: Example Page from Börse und Wirtschaft, later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse
. . .
Notes: The gure displays the top left and top right of page 21 of the January 1933 edition of Börse und Wirtschaft,
later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse. The columns of the left panel report (from left to right) the dividend in 30/31, the
dividend in 31/32, the reporting period, the stock name, and the stock prices of the trading days indicated as column
titles. The columns of the top left panel (from left to right) report additional stock prices and the lowest (niedrigst) and
highest (höchst) stock price and the respective dates in the calender year 1933.
NameChanges: We track stocks even if they change names (for exampleKrauß&Comp. changed
its name to Lokomot. Krauß in July, 1934). In most cases, the reported highest and lowest stock
prices over the calendar year reveal that the stocks changed names. For example, in July 1934
Lokomot. Krauß reported a lowest stock price over the calendar year of 67 for January 19, 1934,
which exactly matches the stock price of Krauß & Comp. on that day. In addition, we verify all
name changes by consulting the narrative information in the Handbuch der deutschen Aktienge-
sellschaften.
Stock Consolidations: Between 1929 and 1943, the stocks of some rms were consolidated. For
example, Dresdner Bank stocks were consolidated on August 4, 1932 at an old-stock:new-stock
ratio of 10:3. As a result, the reported stock price increased by 333 percent. We account for these
consolidations by dividing all stock prices by the consolidation ratio (3.333 in our example) after
each consolidation.
The exact dates of stock consolidations are indicated in the monthly publications of Börse und
Wirtschaft, later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse. To obtain consolidation ratios we exploit informa-
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tion on adjustments to the highest and lowest stock prices that are reported in Börse undWirtschaft,
later Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse.43 After a consolidation, the highest and lowest stock prices are
adjusted to reect the consolidation. This allows us to calculate exact consolidation ratios. For ex-
ample the highest and lowest stock price forDresdner Bank were reported as 1812 and 24 in July 1932
but the reporting changed to 6123 and 80 in August 1932 (Dresdner Bank stocks were consolidated
on August 4, 1932).
In exceptional cases, the highest and lowest stock price changes in the same month as the
consolidation. In those cases, we use the change in the stock price on the date of the consolidation
to infer the consolidation ratio. For example, Brown Boveri stocks were consolidated on January
4, 1935. As the consolidation happened early in the year, highest and lowest stock prices were
reported only after the consolidation and we can therefore not observe adjustments in the reporting
of highest and lowest stock prices. We therefore use the ratio of stock prices on the last trading day
before the consolidation (January 3, 1935, stock price:1434 ) and the stock price on the day of the
consolidation (January 4, 1935, stock price: 74). The consolidation ratio is therefore 5.02 (74/14.75)
in this example.
Deduction of Subscription Rights Between 1929 and 1943 some rms issued new stocks and of-
fered existing shareholders a subscription right to prevent stock dilution. Starting from the day this
subscription right is executed, the monthly publications of Börse und Wirtschaft, later Monatskurs-
blatt Berliner Börse report stock prices ex subscription right. For example, Deutscher Eisenhandel
AG issued new stocks in 1936 and oered existing shareholders a subscription right. The subscrip-
tion right is valued 6.5 percent and deducted starting from August 10, 1936. As a consequence, the
stock price drops mechanically from 138.50 on August 8, 1936 to 132 on August 10, 1936. We adjust
for these deductions by multiplying all subsequent stock prices by an adjustment factor, dened
as the ratio of the old price with subscription right divided by the old price minus the subscription
right.44 In the case of Deutscher Eisenhandel AG this adjustment factor is given by 1.049 ( 138.50138.50−6.50 ).
B.2.2 Dividend Data
The historical listings (called Börse undWirtschaft, laterMonatskursblatt Berliner Börse) of the Berlin
Stock Exchange report dividend payments for the sample rms (see Figure B.4 for an example). As
stocks that get delisted early in the year do not report the latest dividend payment, we augment
the data from the Berlin exchange with information on dividend payments from the Handbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1935 and 1941).
Dividends are generally reported in percent of nominal capital. Insurance rms, however, re-
port dividends in Reichsmark (RM) per stock. To obtain a consistent database we convert the latter
into percent of nominal capital.
43Highest and lowest stock prices are reported for the calendar year.
44This adjustment is standard practice in the construction of long-run stock indices. It assumes that the value of the
subscription right is re-invested into the same stock to prevent stock dilution (Ronge 2002, p. 58).
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B.2.3 Stock Price Adjustments for Dividend Payments
For Appendix Figure A.2, we compute stock prices by taking into account that investors receive
annual dividend payments in addition to capital gains. We collect dividends and their payment
dates from Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse and augment dividend payments with data from Hand-
buch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften 1925 and 1941. To compute stock prices that reect total
returns, we adjust stock prices for price changes that are entirely due to dividend payments (fol-
lowing standard practice as outlined in Ronge 2002). After a dividend payment, we multiply the
stock price by an adjustment factor, which is dened as the ratio of the pre-payment price divided
by the pre-payment price minus the dividend. We use the last observed price in our dataset prior to
the dividend payment as the pre-payment price. In some cases, the exact dividend payment date is
missing in the Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse. As the average rm in our sample pays the dividend
between May and June (but closer to June 1), we use June 1 as the pre-payment price for dividend
payments with missing dates.
B.2.4 Return on Assets
We digitize data on prots and assets from the 1932 and 1941 editions of theHandbuch der deutschen
Aktiengesellschaften. The 1932 edition of the Handbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften reports
the income statements and balance sheets for the year 1931, while the 1941 edition reports the
years 1936 and 1940. The return on assets is the ratio of prots before interest payments and
taxes (calculated from the income statement) to total assets (from the balance sheet). To calculate
prots before interest payments and taxes, we use the book value of prots and subtract the prot
carryforward from the previous year, subtract the net income from the sale of own stocks, subtract
the net income from payments out of reserve funds, add depreciation, add taxes, and add interest
payments.
Many of the 655 rms in our estimation sample do not report the income statement and balance
sheet items that are required for the calculation of the return on assets. As a result, the data allow
us to calculate the return on assets for 289 rms in at least one year (1931, 1936, or 1940). Two rms
do not report values in 1936 or 1940, so we use the 1937 and 1939 values, respectively. Dropping
these observations from the sample does not aect the results.
B.2.5 Firm Age, Nominal Capital, Reporting Period, Industry
We collect data on rm age, nominal capital and the industry of the rm from Handbuch der
deutschen Aktiengesellschaften (1932). We collect data on the period during which the balance sheet
is reported from Monatskursblatt Berliner Börse.
B.2.6 Information on Jewish Firms
We consult historic sources that identify Jewish rms (Bruer 1927; Landsberg 1927a,b; Priester 1927;
Mosse 1987). We extract all rms that are listed as Jewish in at least one of the sources. Figure B.5
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provides an example from Landsberg (1927b). The author describes the historical development
of the textile industry and lists Jewish rms in various sub-industries, for example the furniture
and carpet industry. In the excerpt, Landsberg lists among other rms G. Feibisch and Nordeutsche
Trikotweberei AG, which are listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange.
Figure B.5: Example from Landsberg (1927b)
Ernst Landsberg
firmen des auseinandergefallenen Ko zerns der Aktiengesellschaft Lichtenberger
Wollfabrik und Sommerfelder Textilwerke Akt-Ges. — Durch die Fusion
der Großhandelsfirma Weill & Cie. mit dem Heyne-Konzern in Thüringen und
deren Interessengemeinschaft mit Grünberg ist auch dort eine gewisse
„Mischung" zu verzeichnen.
Als sonst bekannte Firmen seien noch genannt M. & O. Sommerfeld in
Cottbus, in der Vigogneindustrie Marschel Frank Sachs Akt-Ges.
in Chemnitz und mehrere zum Blumenstein-Konzern direkt oder indirekt ge¬
hörende Firmen, besonders die Vereinigten Vigognespinnereien-Akt-Ges. Von
den anderen Zweigen der Wollweberei verzeichnen die Wolldeckenbranche
sowie die Möbelstoff- und Teppichindustrie mehrere jüdische Firmen, bei¬
spielsweise die Rheinische Möbelstoffweberei-Akt-Ges. und Teppichfabrik
Akt-Ges. in Beuel (durch Verwaltungsmajorität), die Teppichfirmen
G. Feibisch, G F. Schwendy, die Möbelstoffweberei Goeritz einschließlich Nord¬
deutsche Trikotweberei vorm. Sprick, Akt-Ges., die Smyrna Teppichfabriken-
Akt-Ges.
In der Baumwollbranche befindet sich der Rohstoffhandel mit
ganz wenigen Ausnahmen in hanseatischen nichtjüdischen Händen. Die
Spinnereien gehören auch meistens christlichen Konsortien, mit Ausnahme
der nach dem Kriege vorgedrungenen Konzerne, nämlich Wolf & Söhne
in Stuttgart-Untertürkheim, die mit anderen zusammen in Deutsch¬
land die Baumwollspinnereien und -Webereien Bamberg, Erlangen und Konzern¬
firmen beherrschen und bei einigen anderen süddeutschen Unternehmungen
Aufsichtsratsstellungen einnehmen, so bei der Spinnerei Lampertsmühle. Der
örtlichen Gliederung nach gibt es sonst keinen jüdischen Konzern mit
Ausnahme der in Bocholt an den Karstadt-Konzern angeschlossenen Webe¬
reien. Die anderen Großkonzerne Hammersen und Dierig haben christ¬
liche Führung (mit Ausnahme eines Direktors bei Dierig). Die Beteiligung
an den Meyer-Kauffmann-Textilwerken wurde wieder aufgegeben. Der 1925
ausgebrochene Kampf zwischen Blumenstein und Hammersen um die Gesell¬
schaft für Spinnerei und Weberei in Ettlingen, der zum Teil unter antisemi¬
tischen Gesichtspunkten geführt wurde, endete mit dem Siege Blumensteins,
der wegen der unglücklichen Taktik von Generaldirektor Häcker (Hammersen)
leicht das Bankkapital auf seine Seite bringen konnte. Gebr. Blumenstein
kontrollieren auch die Baumwollbetriebe des Ebersbach-Lörracher Konzerns
und die Gruppe Rubbert (Hohenlimburg). Die anderen jüdischen Baumwoll-
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Notes: The gure displays an xcerpt from page 108 of Landsberg (1927b).
B.2.7 Identifying Jewish Shareholders
We collect information o all large shareholders of the 655 rms listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange
from the 1932 edition of theHandbuch der deutschen Aktiengesellschaften. We match the list of these
large shareholders with our lists of Jewish managers and Jewish rms. For shareholders that are not
listed in these sources we conduct an inter et search to nd further information on the respective
individual or rm. The following example provides an overvi w of the proc dure.
Example Internet Search
One example of a rm listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange is Baroper Walzwerk AG. The rm
reports Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA as one of its large shareholders. We rst check whether
Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA appears in sources about Jewish rms (see Section B.2.6). After
not nding it in these sources, we conduct an internet search for Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA.
We nd Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA in the database Jewish Businesses in Berlin 1930-1945
(available at: https://www2.hu-berlin.de/djgb/www/nd?language=en_US), which is based on the
research of Kreutzmüller (2017). This allows us to classify Wolf Netter & Jacobi-Werke KGaA as a
large Jewish shareholder of Baroper Walzwerk AG.
B.3 Further Details on Measures of Lower-Level Jewish Employees
We collect measures of lower-level Jewish employees from publications of the German statistical
agency (Statistik des Deutschen Reichs) that are based on the German census of 1933. The publica-
tions report the number of Jews by occupational level (for example workers, blue collar workers
and white collar workers), sector (manufacturing or services), and region (for example East Prussia
without Königsberg) or large city (for example Berlin, Hamburg, Breslau, or Königsberg). When-
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ever we are able to use the city-level information, we do so (for about 33 percent of the sample).
Otherwise, we use the regional information. We also obtain similar information for all German
workers and then calculate the share of Jews among blue collar workers (category “l” in the census
data) and lower-level white collar workers (category “a” in the census data).
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